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WHEN MONEY GREW ON TREES:
LUCY V. ZEHMER AND CONTRACTING
IN A BOOM MARKET
BARAK RICHMAN†
DENNIS SCHMELZER††
A farmer and a lumberman are sitting at a bar.
The lumberman says: “I would like to buy your farm.”
The farmer says: “What is this, some kind of joke?”

ABSTRACT
This Article revisits Lucy v. Zehmer, a 1950s Virginia Supreme
Court ruling that has become a staple in most contracts courses in
American law schools. The colorful facts are well known to nearly all
law students: Lucy and Zehmer met one evening in December 1952 at
a restaurant in Dinwiddie, Virginia, and, following several drinks and
much verbal banter, Zehmer wrote a contract on a restaurant bill, in
which he agreed to sell his farm to Lucy for $50,000. Zehmer later
insisted that he had been intoxicated and had thought the entire matter
was a joke. He testified that he had been “high as a Georgia pine” and
merely bluffing to try to get Lucy to admit that he did not actually
have $50,000. Upholding the contract, the court ruled that regardless
of Zehmer’s intent, his outward behavior could reasonably be
construed to suggest that he had been serious. The court thus invoked
what is known as the “objective theory of contract formation.”
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Our findings suggest that the court misinterpreted the contractual
setting surrounding that December evening in 1952. Our research
uncovers several discoveries: (1) Lucy, acting as a middleman for
southern Virginia’s burgeoning pulp-and-paper industry, sought the
Ferguson farm for its rich timber reserves; (2) Lucy was one of scores
of aggressive timber middlemen in the region who eagerly sought
valuable timberland and prompted a chaotic landgrab, leaving a wake
of shady transactions and colorful litigation; and (3) within eight
years of winning injunctive relief from the Virginia Supreme Court
and purchasing the Ferguson farm from Zehmer for $50,000, Lucy
earned approximately $142,000 from selling the land and its natural
resources. These findings call into question the court’s assertion that
$50,000 was a fair price, its conclusion that Zehmer’s actions
indicated contractual intent, and its confidence that the objective
method captured the relevant background in which Lucy’s and
Zehmer’s exchange took place. More generally, these findings suggest
that conclusions reached by the objective method are highly
dependent on both the facts that are retold and the context in which
those facts occurred, and that historical analysis can meaningfully
illustrate the limits of legal doctrines.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Many good stories begin with two men at a bar. Lucy v. Zehmer,
“a staple of contracts casebooks since shortly after it was decided” in
2
1954, is no exception. As generations of law students have learned,
the case of Lucy v. Zehmer involved two men talking over a bottle of
3
liquor the weekend before Christmas. Adrian Hardy Zehmer,
allegedly drunk and joking, scribbled a contract for the sale of his
4
farm on the back of a receipt. Welford Ordway Lucy accepted and
5
left, insisting that Zehmer was bound to the sale. The Virginia
Supreme Court ultimately agreed with Lucy, ruling that a signed
contract, even one signed by two men drinking at a bar, is no laughing
6
matter.
1. Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).
2. See Keith A. Rowley, You Asked for It, You Got It . . . Toy Yoda: Practical Jokes,
Prizes, and Contract Law, 3 NEV. L.J. 526, 527 n.7 (2003) (noting that Lucy v. Zehmer appears
as a “principal case” in ten of fifteen contract-law casebooks published between 2000 and 2003
and is discussed in a “lengthy note” in an eleventh); see also IAN AYRES & RICHARD E.
SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 229 (7th ed. 2008); RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS:
CASES AND DOCTRINE 296 (4th ed. 2008); BRIAN A. BLUM & AMY C. BUSHAW, CONTRACTS:
CASES, DISCUSSION, AND PROBLEMS 71 (2d ed. 2008); STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF
CONTRACT LAW 11 (3d ed. 2006); JOHN D. CALAMARI, JOSEPH M. PERILLO, HELEN
HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER & CAROLINE N. BROWN, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS 1
(5th ed. 2007); DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS: MAKING AND DOING DEALS 37 (3d ed. 2011); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CAROL SANGER, NEIL B. COHEN & RICHARD R.W.
BROOKS, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 117 (7th ed. 2008); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN
ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 370 (8th ed. 2006); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR.,
CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 52 (5th ed. 2000); ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS,
CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 13 (4th ed. 2007); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A.
HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 441
(6th ed. 2010); Kenneth M. Alfano, Copyright in Exile: Restoring the Original Parameters of
Exclusive Reproduction, 11 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 215, 242 n.117 (2006) (noting that Lucy v.
Zehmer “is a fixture of many law school Contracts casebooks”); Douglas L. Leslie, How Not To
Teach Contracts, and Any Other Course: Powerpoint, Laptops, and the Casefile Method, 44 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1289, 1300 (2000) (commenting on the “frequency with which Lucy v. Zehmer”
appears in contracts casebooks).
3. Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 519 (“I was already high as a Georgia pine, and didn’t have any
more better sense than to pour another great big slug out and gulp it down, and he took one
too.” (quoting Hardy Zehmer) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
4. Id. at 517–18.
5. Id. at 518.
6. See id. at 522 (“The complainants are entitled to have specific performance of the
contract sued on.”). The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was the highest court in Virginia at
the time. Due to changes made in the Virginia Constitution of 1971, the court today is known as
the Supreme Court of Virginia. THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA (2010), available at http://
www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/scvinfo.pdf. To avoid confusion, we refer to the court by its
present, rather than its historic, title.

RICHMAN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1514

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/20/2012 12:32 AM

[Vol. 61:1511

That is, at least, the conventional story of the case, as told by the
7
court, subsequent casebooks, and scholarly articles. For the most
part, Lucy v. Zehmer is narrowly read to represent its final holding: a
court will only look to the outwardly manifested conduct of the
8
parties to determine contractual intent. This principle, also referred
9
to as the “objective theory of contracts,” remains as solidly
entrenched in law in 2012 as when the court’s opinion was issued
10
more than five decades ago. And even though the case presents a
straightforward legal issue, stemming from what appeared to be a

7. See, e.g., Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 929,
957 (1958) (noting that the court in Lucy v. Zehmer held that a promisor who “signed [a]
document as a joke although he kept a straight face to the promisee” was bound to keep that
promise). Professors Edwin Patterson, George Goble, and Harry Jones were among the first to
include the case in a casebook. In their book, these authors questioned whether Lucy had
known that Zehmer had been joking and whether that fact mattered. See EDWIN W.
PATTERSON, GEORGE W. GOBLE & HARRY W. JONES, CONTRACTS 22–26 (4th ed. 1957)
(“Suppose the plaintiff knew that the defendant in the principal case intended the matter as a
joke. What should be the result?”); see also Keith A. Rowley, Beware of the Dark Side of the
Farce, 10 NEV. L.J. 15, 15 (2002) (“The case best known to most lawyers and judges in which a
party attempted to avoid contractual liability on the basis that it was only kidding when it made
the alleged promise or formed the alleged contract is Lucy v. Zehmer.”); Lauren E. Miller,
Note, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Failure of the Objective Theory To Promote Fairness
in Language-Barrier Contracting, 43 IND. L. REV. 175, 183 (2009) (citing Lucy v. Zehmer for the
principle that a contract is still enforceable when a party claims to have been joking when the
contract was signed).
8. See, e.g., Timothy S. Hall, Magic and Contract: The Role of Intent, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN
L. REV. 464, 466 (2005) (noting that Lucy v. Zehmer is “studied by many first-year law students”
to demonstrate the “elementary principle of contracts that the relevant intent is the objective,
expressed intent of the actor, not his secret, subjective intent”); Laura E. Little, Regulating
Funny: Humor and the Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1235, 1258 (2009) (citing Lucy v. Zehmer for
the proposition that a person cannot claim that he was just joking when his words and conduct
would lead a reasonable person to believe otherwise).
9. See Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353, 381
(2007) (explaining that Lucy v. Zehmer is one of the “classic cases” used to demonstrate the
“objective theory of contracts”); see also Wayne Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76
U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1125 (2008) (describing Lucy v. Zehmer as “an illustrative case” of the
principles embodied by the objective theory of contracts); Christopher R. Drahozal, Privatizing
Civil Justice: Commercial Arbitration and the Civil Justice System, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 578,
578 (2000) (describing the conflict in Lucy v. Zehmer as one between “the objective versus
subjective theory of contract”); Geoffrey R. Watson, A Casebook for All Seasons?, 20 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 277, 282 (1997) (reviewing E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS (5th ed. 1995)) (calling Lucy v. Zehmer “an excellent
introduction to the objective theory of contract”).
10. See Solan, supra note 9, at 354–55 (“The actual states of mind of the parties are not the
subject of legally relevant inquiry. . . . While there is some debate about how and when this state
of affairs developed, there is little controversy about its existence.” (footnote omitted)).
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11

remarkably simple contract, its story—in large part because of its
colorful fact pattern—has become a “classic case[]” used to introduce
12
foundational principles related to intent in contracts. Despite this
attention, little more is known about the case than what is found in
the Virginia Supreme Court’s opinion. Given the case’s prominence
in contracts casebooks for more than half a century, and given the
growing body of “stories” research into other prominent and classic
13
cases, the dispute between Welford Lucy and Hardy Zehmer begs to
14
be included in the archive of stories.
Delving into the story of Lucy v. Zehmer, like many of the other
stories inquiries, yields surprises and lessons that both inform the
contemporary understanding of the case and generate deeper insights
into contract law. First, just as scholarly articles suggest that the
15
famous property case about a stolen fox was not really about the fox
and that the famous contracts case about a bridge was not primarily
16
about the bridge, the dispute in Lucy v. Zehmer was not primarily
11. See Stephen M. Edwards, Purchase and Sale Agreements, in 1 MASS. CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUC., INC., DRAFTING COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE DOCUMENTS IN
MASSACHUSETTS ch. 2, § 2.2 (2004 & Supp. 2009), available at Westlaw, DCREDMAI MACLE 2-1 (noting the admirable succinctness of the agreement involved in the case).
12. Impracticable Presidents, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 417, 417 (2003). For the same reasons, the
case is also a favorite example in undergraduate business-law courses. See, e.g., JOHN E.
ADAMSON, LAW FOR PERSONAL AND BUSINESS USE 168 (18th ed. 2008) (offering the Lucy v.
Zehmer fact pattern as an example and asking whether the contract should be enforceable);
FRANK B. CROSS & ROGER LEROY MILLER, THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS: TEXT
AND CASES 200–01 (7th ed. 2009) (using Lucy v. Zehmer to illustrate how courts approach
contractual intent).
13. See, e.g., CONTRACTS STORIES (Douglas G. Baird ed., 2007) (gathering eleven different
articles, each providing newly uncovered facts about and insight into eleven principal cases used
by many contracts casebooks).
14. Professors Robert Scott and Jody Kraus offer an initial hypothesis about what
motivated the parties to this dispute, relying on unsubstantiated rumors relayed by a former
student who grew up in Dinwiddie, but they note that even their hypothesis leaves numerous
questions unanswered. ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY:
TEACHER’S MANUAL 4–5 (3d ed. 2003). We address their hypothesis—and the questions they
pose—in our first Part.
15. Bethany R. Berger, It’s Not About the Fox: The Untold History of Pierson v. Post, 55
DUKE L.J. 1089, 1089 (2006) (arguing that “the heart of the conflict [in Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai.
175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805),] was a contest over which community would control the shared
resources of the town and how those resources would be used,” rather than over literal
ownership of the dead fox that was at the center of the lawsuit).
16. Barak Richman, Jordi Weinstock & Jason Mehta, A Bridge, a Tax Revolt, and the
Struggle To Industrialize: The Story and Legacy of Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 84
N.C. L. REV. 1841, 1841–42 (2006) (explaining how a famous case “used to illustrate the ‘duty to
mitigate’” in many contracts casebooks was actually rooted in a “dispute . . . about the
legitimacy of local government”).
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about the Ferguson farm. Instead, the lawsuit was part of a larger
upheaval over the control of increasingly valuable timber resources in
the wake of a Southern revolution in pulp-and-paper production.
Moreover, that this underlying context of the case remained secret for
so long was no accident. The context’s relative obscurity is a
testament to a deliberate and successful effort by the Southern timber
industry, in an attempt to minimize public outcry, to acquire timber
and timberlands through intermediaries like Welford Lucy. That the
context has remained hidden is also a reflection of how economic
circumstances and contractual environments can be concealed both
from an appellate court’s review and from generations of scrutinizing
students.
Although the case is more than five decades old, the trail of
documentary evidence is sufficient to tell a more complete story of
Lucy v. Zehmer. We tell this story in four Parts. First, we take a closer
look at the order of the trial court and the opinion of the Virginia
Supreme Court, identifying inconsistencies and other curiosities in
the later court’s story. Second, we describe the parties to the lawsuit,
taking care to go beyond the narrow caricatures provided by the court
and introducing some important characters—including the lawyers—
who are not part of the traditional narrative. Third, we examine the
history of the lumber and paper industries of southern Virginia and
the state’s industrial revolution through the 1950s, the time period
when the dispute and litigation over the Ferguson farm occurred. The
region’s rapid post-World War II industrialization induced significant
changes in the region’s technology, business models, and timberland
values, which in turn led to conflicts between neighbors and
significant litigation. This economic and social tumult is central to
understanding the context in which Welford Lucy’s momentous
meeting with Hardy Zehmer occurred. And fourth, we discuss the
Lucy brothers’ significant roles in the lumber industry, their success
as industry middlemen, and what might have caused them to litigate
over the Ferguson farm. In light of our findings, we reexamine the
Virginia Supreme Court’s opinion—in particular, revisiting its
conclusion that the transaction was fair and equitable and trying to
appreciate the broader forces at work when Lucy entered Zehmer’s
diner on December 20, 1952.
Perhaps most significant, our findings reveal deficiencies in the
objective theory of contracts, the very doctrine that Lucy v. Zehmer
has come to represent. The Virginia Supreme Court ruled on Lucy’s
behalf because it concluded that the events of that December evening
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would have led a reasonable person to believe that Zehmer intended
17
to enter into a contract. Unmentioned in the court’s narrative are
important features of the economic and legal environment that
surrounded the encounter: significant growth in southern Virginia’s
pulp-and-paper industry, a consequent sharp rise in timber prices, and
a landgrab by zealous timber brokers that generated spurious land
sales and tedious work for southern Virginia’s courtrooms. If the
court had considered these facts in its description of Lucy’s fateful
conversation with Zehmer, a reasonable person may have been less
likely to conclude that Zehmer intended to be contractually bound. In
short, historical analysis not only reveals deficiencies in the court’s
reasoning but also illustrates that the objective method generates
conclusions that are highly dependent on the surrounding narrative.
Historians’ ability to construct alternative narratives therefore
highlights the legal value of historical analysis while weakening the
robustness of the objective theory itself.
I. THE VIEW FROM RICHMOND
Most of Lucy v. Zehmer’s central events took place in Dinwiddie
County, Virginia, a rural community located between Richmond and
the North Carolina border and home to several pivotal Civil War
18
battles in early 1865. Dinwiddie’s economy was historically agrarian,
19
relying chiefly on tobacco and cotton in the early twentieth century.
Although a mere forty miles separate Dinwiddie and Richmond,
Virginia’s state capital, the Dinwiddie court viewed Lucy’s dispute
with Zehmer quite differently from the supreme court in Richmond,
and the unusual interplay between the trial and appellate courts hints
at these different vantage points. In fact, even a surface examination

17. Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954).
18. For a detailed description of Dinwiddie during the Civil War, see RICHARD L. JONES,
DINWIDDIE COUNTY: CARREFOUR OF THE COMMONWEALTH 134–64 (1976). See generally A.
WILSON GREENE, THE FINAL BATTLES OF THE PETERSBURG CAMPAIGN: BREAKING THE
BACKBONE OF THE REBELLION 175–84 (2d ed. 2008) (describing the events leading from the
Battle of Dinwiddie Courthouse to the Battle of Five Forks); Dallas D. Irvine, The Fall of
Richmond: Evacuation and Occupation, 3 J. AM. MIL. INST. 66 (1939) (describing how the
battles in Dinwiddie County “made it imperative to prepare at once for evacuation of the
position on the James”).
19. Walter Gordon Browder & Linwood Everett Lunsford, An Economic and Social
Survey of Dinwiddie County, UNIV. OF VA. RECORD EXTENSION SERIES, Oct. 1937, at 1, 54–55
(“[T]he county is almost entirely agrarian, and the livelihood of the citizens depends upon the
fertility and productiveness of the soil . . . . Tobacco is the leading cash crop . . . . Cotton is the
next most important crop in the county . . . .”).
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of the Virginia Supreme Court’s opinion in Lucy v. Zehmer leaves the
casual reader with some curiosities.
To begin with, in contrast to the appellate court’s embellishment
of the case’s amusing and flavorful fact pattern, the trial court
20
disposed of the case with a humorless and expedient order. After
hearing initial arguments from attorneys on both sides and reviewing
the slim record of evidence—a brief series of depositions taken in the
Brunswick and Dinwiddie County courts before trial—trial Judge
John Garland Jefferson Jr. promptly dismissed the action in a three21
sentence decree. He ruled simply that the Lucy brothers had “failed
to establish their right to specific performance of the alleged
22
contract.”
Perhaps because of the absence of factual determinations from
the trial court, Justice Archibald C. Buchanan provided an elaborate
23
description of the relevant events when he overturned the order.
These circumstances placed the Virginia Supreme Court in the
unusual position of being an initial finder of fact, producing an
appellate opinion many times longer, and much more in depth, than
the trial court’s ruling. Moreover, Justice Buchanan discarded the
lower court’s decision with gusto, finding the contract to be both
legitimate and enforceable and ridiculing Zehmer’s lawyers for
24
advancing “an unusual, if not bizarre, defense.” Rather than
remanding the case to the trial court to determine whether additional
evidence would support the appellate court’s lengthy characterization
of the facts, the Virginia Supreme Court handed Lucy a final victory,
25
allowing him to take possession of the disputed Ferguson farm.
In addition to this unusual dynamic between the trial and
appellate courts, Justice Buchanan’s famous opinion has its own
contradictions and mysteries, very few of which have attracted

20. Record at 9, Lucy, 84 S.E.2d 516 (No. 4272).
21. Id. The evidence relied upon is largely contained in a set of depositions of witnesses
taken in the courthouse of the town of Lawrenceville in neighboring Brunswick County,
Virginia. See generally id. at 10–84 (compiling the depositions taken in preparation for trial).
22. Id. at 518.
23. See generally Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 516–20 (leading the reader through the facts as laid out
in opposing testimony before delving into the legal issues presented by both parties to the
appeal).
24. Id. at 520.
25. Id. at 522–23; see also Deed (1954), in 90 DINWIDDIE COUNTY DEED BOOK 365, 365–
66 (containing a copy of the deed confirming the transfer of the Ferguson farm from A.H.
Zehmer to W.O. Lucy).
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26

attention from legal scholars. Scrutinizing this oft-told but
unquestioned legal tale illuminates where historical analysis might
offer lessons.
A. A Matter of Mysterious Motivations
On the surface, the case described by Justice Buchanan appears
to be a local dispute between two relatively unsophisticated
neighbors. Lucy was a “lumberman and farmer”; Zehmer “operated a
27
restaurant, filling station and motor court”; and the contract
appeared to be informal, uncalculated, and driven by liquor, even if
the court did not ultimately believe that the men had been legally
28
intoxicated at the time. In Dinwiddie County, this view has
persisted; fifty years later, one community leader still described the
29
dispute as arising out of “a little alcohol, cards and greed.”
The record provides a reasonable basis for concluding that the
dispute was the result of impulsive action. Testifying that he had been
26. Among the few who have given some scrutiny to the famous case is the noted legal
scholar Professor Allan Farnsworth, who raises a significant timing issue in the case. See E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS 55–65
(1998) (“[T]he Zehmers were already bound by their promise, even though there was no
possibility that [Lucy] had relied on it in the few seconds between the exchange of promises and
[Zehmer’s] protestation. But why?”). Pointing to Zehmer’s allegations that he had reneged on
his promise shortly after signing the contract and that he had subsequently refused the $5
offered by Lucy for consideration that same night, Professor Farnsworth questions whether such
actions are consistent with the court’s ultimate conclusion that the contract was valid. Id. at 56.
Farnsworth argues that this almost-immediate repudiation of the contract raises crucial
questions about exactly when the contract was formed between the parties and what effect
Zehmer’s subsequent statements should have had on Lucy’s reliance. Id. Nonetheless,
Farnsworth ultimately defends the court’s decision to uphold the contract despite these issues
with timing, arguing that once a contract is signed, it does not matter when a party reneges on
that contract. Id. at 58. Farnsworth argues that the law presumes that reliance takes place
whether disagreement is expressed two minutes or two weeks after a contract’s consummation.
Id. at 59. In response, Professor Richard Spiedel points out that Lucy actually contested these
facts and that, ultimately, the court instead accepted Lucy’s statements that he had already
raised the $50,000 and had consulted his lawyer about the transaction before Zehmer
communicated his refusal to sell. Richard E. Spiedel, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 255, 267 n.57 (2000)
(reviewing FARNSWORTH, supra); see also Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 521–22 (providing the disputed
text). Although only a small issue in the dispute, this timing question is particularly significant to
those seeking to understand the overall contours of the court’s final holding; after all, if what
matters is the outwardly manifested “objective” intent, determining which outward
manifestations the court will consider is important. The timing question is also heavily informed
by the context and surrounding circumstances in which the purported assent takes place.
27. Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 518.
28. See id. at 518–19 (describing the conditions of the negotiation).
29. Email from Richard Liles, President, Bank of McKenney, to author (Mar. 6, 2009, 08:46
AM) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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30

as “high as a Georgia pine,” Zehmer and his attorneys argued that
the alleged contract had been a joke between two “doggoned
31
drunks.”
Zehmer had immediately retracted his purported
acceptance, and the next day a presumably more sober Zehmer had
informed Lucy that he had no intention of holding Lucy to the alleged
32
agreement. Similarly, Lucy, in his own testimony, expressed some
concern about the manner in which the agreement had been
33
reached; when asked by one of Zehmer’s lawyers whether he had
felt drunk or happy on the night of the signing, Lucy answered,
34
“Looks like I must have been feeling rich.”
Even mildly dissecting the court’s opinion reveals a calculated
dispute with more significance than is portrayed in the conventional
telling. If Zehmer had been reluctant to sell and Lucy had believed
the price was too high, they would have had sufficient grounds to
reach an amicable settlement to the supposedly spontaneous and illadvised agreement. But Lucy and Zehmer did not settle. To the
contrary, Lucy promptly secured payment for the farm, and, when
Zehmer refused to deliver title, Lucy hired an attorney and brought
35
suit to compel performance. Then, when the trial court invalidated
that contract—relieving Lucy of any obligation he might have felt to
perform—Lucy pursued an appeal before the state’s highest court,
triggering a legal battle that presumably was costly and time36
consuming for both parties. If the procedural history of Lucy v.
Zehmer reveals anything, it shows that Lucy’s legal actions spoke
much louder than his words of regret.
Moreover, Lucy did not hire just any attorney to enforce the
contract—he sought Virginia’s best. Albertis S. Harrison Jr. who

30. Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 520 (quoting Zehmer) (internal quotation mark omitted).
31. Id. (quoting Zehmer’s characterization of the encounter as “two doggoned drunks
bluffing to see who could talk the biggest and say the most” (internal quotation mark omitted)).
The court ultimately concluded that “Zehmer [had] not been intoxicated to the extent of being
unable to comprehend the nature and consequences of the instrument he [had] executed, and
hence that [the] instrument [wa]s not to be invalidated on that ground.” Id.
32. Id. at 521.
33. Id. The court noted that Lucy had admitted that he “[had] been stuck before and
[would go] through with it.” Id. (quoting Lucy) (internal quotation mark omitted).
34. Record, supra note 20, at 63.
35. Id. at 46–48.
36. The dispute lasted nearly two years, from the initial dispute through Zehmer’s final
conveyance of the property to the Lucy brothers. See Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 517 (noting that the
dispute began on December 20, 1952); Deed, supra note 25, at 365 (recording the conveyance of
the Ferguson farm to the Lucy brothers on December 17, 1954).
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represented Lucy at both the trial and the appellate level, was a
legendary figure in Virginia. In the 1960s, at the height of his power,
Harrison would serve as Virginia’s governor and then as a justice on
38
the Virginia Supreme Court. By 1952, Harrison’s political clout had
already started to rise. An ambitious state senator who was first
39
elected to the state legislature in 1947, Harrison’s legendary status
began to take shape when he took over as campaign manager for
Senator Harry S. Byrd’s 1952 reelection campaign during a tough
40
year for the senator’s political organization. Harrison was a natural
choice five years later to be the Democratic candidate for attorney
41
general of Virginia, a post that left him “responsible for handling in
court the state’s massive resistance strategy, a plan devised by Byrd to
42
prevent federally ordered integration of the state’s public schools.”
Later, Harrison was depicted by the press as the person responsible
43
for keeping the Byrd machine running smoothly into the 1960s. In

37. Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 517. Lucy was also represented by local judge Emerson D. Baugh,
id., a judge in Brunswick County. Although Judge Baugh did not have the same notoriety as
Harrison, he evidently was a respected lawyer in southside Virginia. See 2 MARTINDALEHUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 2444 (1956) (giving Judge Baugh a very high recommendation).
38. Wolfgang Saxon, Albertis S. Harrison Jr., 88, Dies; Led Virginia as Segregation Fell,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1995, at B8.
39. Materials from this first election are available at the Governor Albertis Harrison Room
of the Brunswick County Museum in Lawrenceville, Virginia. Copies of these materials are on
file with the Duke Law Journal.
40. See, e.g., Peter R. Henriques, The Byrd Organization Crushes a Liberal Challenge,
1950–1953, 87 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 1, 18 (1979) (describing how seriously Senator
Byrd took a primary challenge from liberal Democrats and explaining that, to counter the
challenge, “[a] knowledgeable state senator and future governor, Albertis S. Harrison, was
tapped as Byrd’s campaign manager”).
41. GAY NEALE WITH HENRY L. MITCHELL, JR. & W.M. PRITCHETT, BRUNSWICK
COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 1720–1975, at 287 (1975).
42. Albertis Harrison, Governor 1962–66, DAILY PRESS (Newport News, Va.), Jan. 24,
1995, at B4, available at 1995 WLNR 4777880.
43. A political cartoon from July 13, 1961, for example, depicts Harrison’s lasting influence
with the Byrd machine even into the 1960s. In the cartoon, Harrison sits with his arm around
Senator Byrd in a 1920s-era automobile labeled the Byrd Machine. The caption reads: “The old
buggy runs as good as ever, Harry!” Allie Edward Stakes Stephens, another Byrd adviser, is
depicted falling off the vehicle. The cartoon thus appears to show Harrison gaining influence in
the Byrd Machine at the expense of Stephens. The cartoon is on file with the Duke Law
Journal.
Although Stephens remained a disciple of Byrd in the 1950s—and was elected lieutenant
governor with Byrd’s support—he later broke with the Byrd Machine over school
desegregation. A Guide to the Papers of A.E.S. Stephens, 1949–1961, VA. HERITAGE, http://ead.
lib.virginia.edu/vivaxtf/view?docId=odu/vino00007.xml (last visited Mar. 19, 2012). Stephens ran
for governor in 1961 without Byrd’s support and easily lost the primary to Byrd’s chosen
candidate, Albertis S. Harrison. The race was seen as an indication that the Byrd Machine

RICHMAN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1522

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/20/2012 12:32 AM

[Vol. 61:1511

short, Lucy’s lawyer was the man to whom Senator Byrd turned for
counsel and to whom Virginia turned in its last stand to defend
44
segregation.
Curiously sandwiched between fixing the Byrd Machine in 1952
and making Virginia’s last stand in defense of segregation in 1958 was
Harrison’s involvement as the plaintiffs’ lead attorney in Lucy v.
Zehmer. These facts raise two important questions: Why did Lucy
retain such a big name to argue such a small case, and why did
Harrison accept the representation? Lucy’s actions belie the cashstrapped buyer depicted in his own testimony and in the court’s
opinion, and, compared to the other statewide challenges that
Harrison took on, a provincial liquor-induced dispute over a farm in
southern Virginia seems downright pedestrian.
B. The $50,000 Question
Questions about the motivations underlying Lucy v. Zehmer
ultimately lead to questions about the disputed object—the Ferguson
45
farm—and whether $50,000 was really a fair price for the property.
All too often, students and scholars overlook this question, and some
46
casebooks omit the court’s discussion of price altogether. Such an
remained a force in Virginia politics despite the political infighting of the 1950s. See Virginia:
Byrd’s Nest, TIME, July 21, 1961, at 15 (reporting that “the primary did make one thing clear: if
Harry Byrd is losing his grip, no one has told the voters of Virginia”).
44. Saxon, supra note 38. Harrison reportedly had his doubts about Byrd’s campaign of
massive resistance, noting “in a letter to Byrd in August 1958 . . . [that] admission of blacks to
white schools probably was inevitable.” Albertis Harrison, Governor 1962–66, supra note 42.
But Harrison, the consummate attorney, was willing to fight hard to delay this inevitable result.
As he wrote in a letter in July 1957,
Before this case was tried, I too had an idea, which I expressed to the Commission,
that . . . we could literally litigate negro plaintiffs to death and force them to exhaust
administrative remedies. At that time, I envisioned appeals to the School Boards,
then to the Circuit Court and then to our Supreme Court.
Letter from Senator A.S. Harrison Jr., to Hon. C. Harrison Mann Jr. 2 (July 27, 1957) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal). Although Harrison was ultimately unsuccessful in preventing
desegregation during his tenure as attorney general, his strategy did delay it. He succeeded, for
example, in forcing the NAACP to refile a constitutional challenge against state laws designed
to delay integration—which had been previously successfully litigated in federal court—in a
substantially less favorable Virginia state court. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 179
(1959) (“[T]he judgment below will be vacated and the case remanded to the District Court,
with instructions to afford the appellees a reasonable opportunity to bring appropriate
proceedings in the Virginia courts . . . .”).
45. This was the first question asked by one local historian after his initial review of the
case. Interview with Ronald Seagrave (Feb. 27, 2009).
46. See, e.g., AYRES & SPEIDEL, supra note 2, at 229–32 (omitting the court’s discussion of
price); BURTON, supra note 2, at 11–15 (same); CALAMARI ET AL., supra note 2, at 1–7 (same);
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omission is not necessarily illogical. Both parties stipulated in their
initial pleadings that a real-estate expert, C.C. Johnson, would, if
47
called, testify that $50,000 was a fair price for the Ferguson farm.
Moreover, casebook authors most often rely upon Lucy v. Zehmer to
demonstrate the main theory set forward by the court—the objective
theory of contract formation—which dictates that one should look for
objective signs of offer and acceptance rather than scrutinize the
48
fairness of the transaction.
An assessment of the fairness of the sales price was, however,
central to the court’s evaluation of Zehmer’s equity claim, and Justice
Buchanan relied on contextual evidence in determining that $50,000
had been an objectively reasonable price for the farm. In rather
sweeping language, Justice Buchanan denied the equity claim because
“[t]he farm had been bought for $11,000 and was assessed for taxation
at $6,300. The purchase price was $50,000. Zehmer admitted that it
49
was a good price.” If anything, Justice Buchanan described the deal
as a windfall for Zehmer.
But if the contract had truly created a windfall for Zehmer, why
would Zehmer have invested so much in invalidating it, and, similarly,
why would Lucy have tried so vigorously to enforce it? Although
Justice Buchanan noted that Zehmer had expressed some interest in
giving the farm to his son, the court’s opinion does not explain why
Zehmer had wanted his son to have the Ferguson farm in particular
or why Zehmer could not, with his supposed windfall, have purchased
50
a similar farm and pocketed the difference.
There are other reasons to question Justice Buchanan’s valuation
even though it came directly from the record. First, Justice Buchanan
only provided the historical price at which Zehmer had bought the
farm and the property’s tax assessment, neither of which is a reliable

THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON
CONTRACTS 1–7 (4th ed. 2004) (same); FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 2, at 117–20 (same);
GEORGE W. KUNEY & ROBERT M. LLOYD, CONTRACTS: TRANSACTIONS AND LITIGATION 3–
10 (3d ed. 2011) (same).
47. Record, supra note 20, at 10.
48. See, e.g., Solan, supra note 9, at 354–55 (summarizing the objective theory of contracts).
49. Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954).
50. See id. at 520 (noting Zehmer’s intention to give the farm to his son). The situation
might have been different if the Ferguson farm had been in the Zehmer family for generations,
but Zehmer had only acquired the property in 1943, Deed (1943), in 69 DINWIDDIE COUNTY
DEED BOOK 167, 167, eleven years before the litigation commenced.
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indicator of the fair market value of real estate. At the same time,
Justice Buchanan failed to include other relevant values, including
Lucy’s offers in 1944 and 1945 of $20,000 for the same farm, only a
52
year or so after Zehmer had purchased it for $11,000. The court
mentioned this fact in its discussion of enforceability but omitted the
53
fact from its discussion of price.
The mixed circumstantial evidence is enough to question
whether Zehmer really did enjoy a windfall, or whether Lucy may in
fact have been the party who received a bonanza profit. Nevertheless,
Zehmer appears to have thought, at least at first, that $50,000 was a
54
good price for the farm. The price seemed so good, in fact, that

51. The $11,000 price that Hardy Zehmer originally paid for the Ferguson farm was, in
accounting terms, the farm’s historical or “book value,” see Vicki O. Tucker, Pattie G. Meire &
Phyllis M. Rubinstein, The RTC: A Practical Guide to the Receivership/Conservatorship Process
and the Resolution of Failed Thrifts, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 17 n.74 (1990) (explaining that book
value is generally historical value), but book values are generally regarded as unrealistic and
unreliable, particularly for real-estate assets that appreciate over time, see Peta Spender, Guns
and Greenmail: Fear and Loathing After Gambotto, 22 MELB. U. L. REV. 96, 99–100 (1998)
(“The book value of the land held by the company at the time of the meeting was $15,035,000,
but its market value was estimated to be $25,977,000. It is therefore a reasonable assumption
that the value of the assets held by the company was increasing.”). Tax assessments—which rely
on many factors unrelated to market prices—can be even more problematic. See William E.
Banfield, Real Estate Taxes, in NEGOTIATING THE SOPHISTICATED REAL ESTATE DEAL 2008:
HIGH-STAKES STRATEGIES IN CHALLENGING TIMES 215, 218 (PLI Real Estate Law & Practice,
Course Handbook Ser. No. 554, 2008) (noting that “value for real estate tax purposes is often
different than value for other purposes . . . and in most cases it is very different from purchase
price” (emphasis omitted)).
52. Record, supra note 20, at 2, 56 (referencing Deed, supra note 50, at 167).
53. Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 518 (explaining that Zehmer similarly backed out of that alleged
contract for the farm). Even Justice Buchanan’s best argument for the price’s fairness, that
“Zehmer [had] admitted that [$50,000] was a good price,” id. at 522, is questionable because the
admission was arguably taken out of context. Zehmer made the statement at a Christmas party
the day after the contract had been signed. It was an informal environment, and when Zehmer
saw Lucy, he approached Lucy to tell him that they did not have a deal, even though he was
“not trying to say this because . . . the price [was] too cheap.” Record, supra note 20, at 38.
Instead, Zehmer explained, “[I]f I wanted to sell, I think $50,000 would be a good price, and I
think you would get stuck.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). How much research Zehmer
had done before making this casual judgment about the price is unclear. This lack of familiarity
with contemporary prices for land was similarly evident when Zehmer made clear in his
deposition that he was not prepared to discuss prices. See id. at 33 (showing that Zehmer did not
remember when he had bought the farm, how many acres the farm had included, or how much
he had paid for the farm).
54. Record, supra note 20, at 44–45. During his deposition, Zehmer recalled having told
Lucy the day after the alleged contract had been signed, “I am not trying to claim it wasn’t a
deal on account of the fact the price was too low . . . . If I had wanted to sell $50,000.00 would be
a good price, in fact I think you would get stuck at $50,000.00.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Zehmer allegedly did not believe that Lucy was serious. Lucy, by
contrast, must have felt that the price was a bargain that was worth
pursuing through an expensive appeal. Clarifying the actual
economics of the transaction may go a long way toward explaining
the unusual banter that December evening.
C. Alternative Narratives
A number of dynamics are at play when an appellate court
reverses a lower court’s ruling, particularly when the reversal is as
sweeping as the Virginia Supreme Court’s rejection of Judge
Jefferson’s refusal to award Lucy the Ferguson farm. Many of these
familiar dynamics, articulated by historians and legal scholars, appear
to have been present in the trial and appellate proceedings in Lucy v.
Zehmer and may explain the two courts’ sharp disagreement as to
how the case should have been decided.
One standard explanation is simple judicial politics. Harrison’s
extensive political activities on behalf of the Democratic Byrd
56
Machine, including his role as a state senator on the senate
committee that recommended candidates for judicial appointment,
may have given Harrison influence over the justices on the Virginia
57
Supreme Court —all of whom were Democrats or at least
58
Democratic appointees. Zehmer, by contrast, was active in the
state’s Republican Party and served as an alternate delegate from
Virginia to the Republican National Conventions in 1948, 1952, and
59
1956. Along these lines, one leading casebook speculates that
“[a]pparently the Zehmers were infamous as being the only
Republicans in this rural south side Virginia county during the era of
60
the Byrd machine and were not ‘well-liked.’” One must remember

55. See, e.g., id. at 38 (“I thought he was just needling me. I didn’t think then [that] he
considered it a deal.”).
56. See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text.
57. See Letter from Senator A.S. Harrison Jr., to Hon. C. Harrison Mann Jr., supra note 44,
at 1 (noting that Harrison was on the Senate Committee on Courts of Justice).
58. Governors of Virginia, ENCYCLOPEDIA VA., http://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/
Governors_of_Virginia (last updated Jan. 18, 2012) (listing all of the former governors of
Virginia and showing that all of the governors from 1886 to 1970 were Democrats).
59. Lawrence Kestenbaum, Index to Politicians: Zealey to Ziegeweid, POL. GRAVEYARD,
http://politicalgraveyard.com/bio/zebb-ziegenheim.html (last updated Dec. 12, 2011) (entry for
Zehmer, A.H.).
60. SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 14, at 5 (quoting one of Professor Scott’s students who
was from Dinwiddie County). But Professors Scott and Kraus ultimately conclude: “While [the
fact that the Zehmers were not well liked] might explain local prejudice against the Zehmers, it
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that the 1950s were a time when the Democratic and Republican
parties were thoroughly consumed with fights over segregation and
were bitterly divided in Virginia. Justice Buchanan also fits into this
61
narrative: his vitriolic opinion in Naim v. Naim, which upheld the
constitutionality of Virginia’s antimiscegenation laws and which was
issued only one year after Lucy v. Zehmer, suggests that his court may
62
well have been hostile toward Republican litigants.
Nonetheless, despite an exhaustive search, we have found little
evidence that Zehmer would have been an obvious target of the Byrd
Machine. In fact, Zehmer’s lead defense counsel—Morton G.
63
Goode—was also a prominent Democrat and state senator. The trial
judge who initially dismissed the suit, Judge Jefferson Jr., was
similarly active in local Democratic politics and was probably a

doesn’t explain what happened here. The Zehmers won in the Dinwiddie circuit court. They lost
at the Supreme Court in Richmond where presumably no one knew anyone.” Id. There is
reason to suspect, however, that politically motivated discrimination against Zehmer might have
been more pronounced in Richmond than in Dinwiddie. The Virginia Supreme Court would
have known Albertis S. Harrison Jr., the lead attorney for the plaintiffs. But Harrison, originally
from Brunswick County, NEALE, supra note 41, at 288, might not have been as well known by
the circuit court in neighboring Dinwiddie County as Zehmer’s lawyers, see Lucy v. Zehmer, 84
S.E.2d 516, 517 (Va. 1954) (listing White and Goode as Zehmer’s attorneys). who had both
spent most of their careers as officers of that court, see, e.g., Deed (1938), in 62 DINWIDDIE
COUNTY DEED BOOK 600, 600 (noting that White was a special commissioner in the court).
Accordingly, a political explanation might suggest that Zehmer won in the local forum, where
his local counsel were better known, and Lucy subsequently won in the state capital, where his
lead attorney was a rising star.
61. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955).
62. Justice Buchanan’s opinion concludes,
We are unable to read in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, or in any
other provision of that great document, any words or any intendment which prohibit
the State from enacting legislation to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens, or
which denies the power of the State to regulate the marriage relation so that it shall
not have a mongrel breed of citizens. We find there no requirement that the State
shall not legislate to prevent the obliteration of racial pride, but must permit the
corruption of blood even though it weaken or destroy the quality of its citizenship.
Both sacred and secular history teach that nations and races have better advanced in
human progress when they cultivated their own distinctive characteristics and culture
and developed their own peculiar genius.
Id. at 756.
63. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, BOOK OF THE STATES 1952–1953, at 559 (1952)
(listing Morton G. Goode as the president pro tem of the Virginia state senate—a body
composed of thirty-eight Democrats and two Republicans at the time); A Guide to the Harry
Flood Byrd, Sr. Papers, VA. HERITAGE, http://ead.lib.virginia.edu/vivaxtf/view?docId=uva-sc/
viu01045.xml (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (referencing an array of correspondence sent between
Senator Byrd and M.G. Goode between 1923 and 1948).
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64

member of the Byrd Machine. These facts undermine the
supposition that Zehmer was somehow the victim of politicized
Democrats in Richmond.
A second explanation rests on the different policy priorities of
the trial and appellate judges. By the time Lucy filed for an injunction
in his courtroom, Judge Jefferson was an established jurist with a law
degree from the University of Virginia and nearly twenty years on the
65
bench. A descendant of prominent colonial families on both parental
66
lines and, reportedly, an enthusiastic farmer, Judge Jefferson was
likely to attribute deep and perhaps romantic significance to a
farmer’s connection to his family farm and might have resisted swift,
potentially spontaneous, and loosely documented land sales. Agrarian
life enjoyed a glorified status in Virginia society, as many of Virginia’s
legendary family dynasties were linked to ownership of substantial
67
rural estates, and Virginia culture held up agrarian ideals, even after
industrialization started dominating the twentieth-century Southern
68
economy.
The state supreme court in Richmond, by contrast, may have
been more concerned with the demands of modern commerce,
including the alienability of property. Scholars have recognized that
state supreme courts were very policy oriented, as opposed to
formalistic, when articulating contract law and, especially, when
69
adjudicating land disputes. Even while local courts were sensitive to

64. VIRGINIA LIVES: THE OLD DOMINION WHO’S WHO 507 (Richard Lee Morton ed.,
1964) (“A member of the Democratic Party, Mr. Jefferson served as Chairman of the Amelia
Democratic Committee.”).
65. See id. (“John G. Jefferson, Jr., attended . . . the University of Virginia, from which he
received his Bachelor of Laws degree in 1908. Engaged in a private law practice from 1908 to
1938, Mr. Jefferson served as Trial Justice of Amelia and Powhatan Counties from 1934 to 1938,
and as Judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit from 1938 until his retirement on August 31, 1962.”).
66. Id.
67. See infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
68. See generally TWELVE SOUTHERNERS, I’LL TAKE MY STAND: THE SOUTH AND THE
AGRARIAN TRADITION (1930) (discussing agrarian idealism and its devoted resistance to
industrialization across the South); PAUL V. MURPHY, THE REBUKE OF HISTORY: THE
SOUTHERN AGRARIANS AND AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT 67–68 (2001) (describing
a debate in Richmond, attended by 3500 people, on the clash of agrarian ideals against
industrialism); Wayne Mixon, Resistance to Industrialization, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SOUTHERN CULTURE 724, 724–26 (Charles Reagan Wilson & William Ferris eds., 1989)
(discussing the depth of agrarian attitudes and the impact of both the publication of I’LL TAKE
MY STAND, supra, and the agrarian literary movement from the Civil War to the early 1970s).
69. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 33–34 (1965) (discussing
the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s treatment of land transactions between 1826 and 1861 and
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personal and historical attachments to land, appellate courts—in part
deliberately aiming to contrast American alienability with feudal
systems—were deliberately supportive of enforcing land sales and
70
encouraging the acquisition of land for commercial development.
More broadly, American law during and following the New Deal
challenged persistent notions of social hierarchy and expanded the
71
even-handed enforcement of contract and property rights. This
move toward modernity further greased the wheels of rapid
commerce and enhanced the alienability of property, including family
farms.
The Lucy opinion appears to have been part of this trend. As
72
Virginia’s economy became more industrial during the 1950s,
nationwide legal reforms that were designed to facilitate commercial
dealings and the predictability of contractual rights had an acute
effect in Virginia. The Uniform Commercial Code was introduced for
73
the first time to eight state legislatures in the 1950s, and Virginia was
74
pursuing reforms of its own commercial code. Legal reforms
designed to facilitate commercial transactions would have been a
much higher priority for the state supreme court than for a regional
judge—or an avid farmer—in rural Dinwiddie County.
Judge Jefferson might also contribute to yet another narrative
that has gained attention among legal historians. Judge Jefferson’s
dismissive rejection of Lucy’s claims may have simply been the
product of a deeply rooted Southern tradition in which local judges,
less concerned about uniform legal principles, assumed the role of
75
“maintaining the peace” in local communities. Judicial localism

noting that the “judicial attitude toward land cases was . . . strongly colored by considerations of
public policy” and that “the court examined [the existing legal] system with a critical eye”).
70. See id. at 28–29 (describing the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s attitude toward land
transactions during the same time period).
71. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 384–85
(2002).
72. See SOUTHSIDE STUDY COMM., ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE VA. ECON., A SURVEY
OF THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF SIX SOUTHSIDE VIRGINIA COUNTIES 51–55 (1960)
(summarizing the growth in manufacturing during the 1940s and 1950s).
73. William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 8 (1967).
74. See, e.g., George D. Gibson & George C. Freeman, Jr., A Decade of the Model Business
Corporation Act in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REV. 1396, 1396–98 (1967) (describing efforts to
modernize and codify Virginia corporation law).
75. See, e.g., LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE: LEGAL CULTURE
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH 4 (2009)
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rested on a loose set of power dynamics and a rough sense of justice
76
that “allow[ed] local custom, politics, and law to mingle freely” and
in which “judgments rested on the situated knowledge of observers in
local communities [largely] through family and neighborly ties and
77
continually assessed through gossip networks.” Predictably, local
Southern law was not a technical enterprise and instead “depended
on information conveyed orally by ordinary people,” with written
materials serving a secondary role “as a reminder of oral knowledge
78
that had determined the process.”
Like much of southeast Virginia, Dinwiddie County—for many
of the reasons discussed in the next Sections—was having more than
79
its fair share of land disputes, and Judge Jefferson was likely
alarmed by the litigation and unseemly contracting practices that had
found their way into his and other courtrooms. His priority, like many
other local Southern judges, might have been chiefly to maintain the
80
stable status quo. Judge Jefferson’s terse ruling, lack of legal
analysis, and sparse justification for maintaining the status quo all
81
match the concept of “local peace” in both substance and style.

(describing the development of this tradition of localism in the Carolinas during the antebellum
period).
76. Id. at 5.
77. Id. at 7.
78. Id. at 4.
79. For a discussion of the significant experience thrust upon southern Virginia’s judges in
adjudicating land disputes, see infra Part III.D.
80. EDWARDS, supra note 75, at 7 (“Keeping the peace meant keeping everyone—from the
lowest to the highest—in their appropriate places, as defined in specific local contexts. Local
courts focused on the resolution of these highly personal, idiosyncratic disputes.”). Substantial
evidence suggests that local judges and court officials were intimately familiar with the litigants
who appeared in their chambers—and the gossip accompanying their disputes. Id. at 7–8.
Welford Lucy, Hardy Zehmer, and Hardy Zehmer’s wife, for example, very publicly discussed
the alleged contract with neighbors—and each other—the day after the contract was signed.
These discussions took place, of all places, at a house party hosted by the “brother of the
[Dinwiddie County] Clerk of the Court.” Record, supra note 20, at 26–27, 37–38. A few days
later, Zehmer argued with Lucy again about the contract, a conversation that occurred “in the
presence of Judge Barrow.” Record, supra note 20, at 38. Judge B. Hunter Barrow was a county
judge in Dinwiddie between 1934 and 1970. JONES, supra note 18, at 184.
81. Professor Laura Edwards’s description of social stability within a stable and familiar
community of actors, see, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 75, at 7–8, relates to what economists
might describe as the sustained benefits from continued reciprocity. The local institutions that
promoted reciprocity in the South were similar to the extralegal mechanisms that early law-andsociety scholars credit for maintaining stable commercial relationships, see Mark Galanter,
Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM
1, 24 (1981); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AMER. SOC. REV. 55, 63 (1963); to what game theorists modeled as self-sustaining cooperation,
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This appearance of localism in Judge Jefferson’s ruling could be
precisely what led to a sharp rebuke from Justice Buchanan. The
Virginia Supreme Court, like other statewide bodies, likely “aspired
to create a unified body of law and a centralized institutional
82
structure to enforce it.” Lucy v. Zehmer was tried at a time when
advocates of unified notions of law were seeking to limit the
inconsistency and discretion inherent in decentralized notions of
justice. The Uniform Commercial Code, for example, was attracting
considerable attention from state courts and legislatures at that time,
in large part because it aimed to “relegate local tradition, prejudice
and provincialism to a position secondary to clarity, simplification,
83
standardization and uniformity of the laws.” Appellate courts often
imposed principles of law precisely to counter local preferences for
societal stability.
Although each of these narratives is independently capable of
providing a meaningful and revealing new perspective on the story of
Lucy v. Zehmer, our preferred narrative is more economic in nature.
We report that Lucy v. Zehmer took place within a rapidly changing
economic climate that heightened the economic incentives to acquire
land. Such opportunities to profit quickly from land encouraged
transactions that both created economic upheaval and facilitated
dramatic economic transition. The Lucy brothers played active roles
in this industrial transformation, and our inclination toward an
economic narrative is guided significantly by our early discovery that
Welford Lucy was a shrewd and aggressive businessman who,
reflecting his era, capitalized on an economy in transition and social
roles in flux.

see ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 118–20 (1984); and to what some
economic historians and institutionalists attributed to the efficacy of prelegal reputation
mechanisms, see Avner Grief, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade:
The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525, 525–48 (1993); Paul Milgrom, Doug
North & Barry Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant,
Private Judges, and the Champaign Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1, 1–2 (1990).
82. EDWARDS, supra note 75, at 4.
83. Samuel A. Dew, The Urge for Uniformity in State Laws, 20 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 56,
62 (1952).
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II. THE FARMER AND THE LUMBERMAN
Some Southern aristocrats, like the Harrisons, could trace the
84
ownership of their lands to a royal charter. Others, like the dynasty
founded by Harry F. Byrd, rose to political and social prominence
85
through the wise acquisition and management of local lands. The
Zehmers of Dinwiddie County fell somewhere in between.
At the time of the dispute in Lucy v. Zehmer, the Zehmers had
been a prominent fixture in Dinwiddie County for more than a
century. The dynasty began with Captain Charles Zehmer, a DutchGerman merchant from Philadelphia who was reportedly a member
86
of elite circles during colonial times. In addition to a fleet of ships,
Captain Zehmer owned a plantation, a tanning business, and
87
extensive land holdings in Virginia and Pennsylvania. Upon his
death, Captain Zehmer left all of his property to his sole heir, a son
named Charles Grandison Zehmer, who subsequently lost the entire
88
estate in a game of cards. Charles Grandison later attended medical
school and returned to his native Dinwiddie County to become a local
89
physician. There Dr. Zehmer raised eleven children, whose
descendants prospered in Dinwiddie County for more than a
90
century. As their prominence grew over time, so did their holdings
91
of land.
The history of the Zehmer family is very much the history of
McKenney, the small town in Dinwiddie County where the Zehmers

84. See Saxon, supra note 38 (noting that Albertis S. Harrison’s “home sat on a tract
deeded to an ancestor, Henry Harrison, by King George II in 1732”).
85. See, e.g., Harry F. Byrd (1887–1966), ENCYCLOPEDIA VA., http://www.encyclopedia
virginia.org/Byrd_Harry_Flood_Sr_1887-1966 (last updated Apr. 7, 2011). Byrd also came from
an established family of colonial fame, but his purchase and efficient management of apple
orchards paved the way for his rise to decades-long dominance in Virginia’s political system. Id.
86. ROBERTA ZEHMER SMITH, ZEHMER: A FAMILY HISTORY 2–3 (Jane C. Arnett ed.,
1984).
87. Id. at 2–4.
88. Id. at 3–4, 13. Charles Grandison Zehmer reportedly only bet his life-estate rights on
the card game, but the property was never returned to the family after his death. Id. at 13–14.
89. Id. at 14.
90. Id. at 14–16.
91. See, e.g., JOHN G. ZEHMER, JR., NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES
REGISTRATION FORM: ZEHMER FARM, DHR NO. 257-5008, § 8, at 10 (2009) (describing the
family’s acquisitions of various properties in the McKenney area). Members of the Zehmer
family are listed as grantees on 386 separate land deeds in Dinwiddie County dated between the
years 1847 and 1986.
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lived. Named after William Robertson McKenney, a railroad
93
attorney from Richmond, McKenney was founded around 1900
when the railroad was built to connect the isolated and rural south of
94
Dinwiddie County to the Richmond market to the north. Many local
institutions, such as the local bank, were established during this
period to meet the sudden demand generated by this growing
95
commercial link. Among these institutions were several businesses
96
established by the Zehmer family, businesses that cemented the
Zehmers’ influence in the town.
At first, the Zehmers established a sawmill business to cut
lumber for railroad ties, and, as the railroad pushed deeper into
Dinwiddie, the Zehmers purchased vast tracts of timberland to keep
97
up with the railroad’s needs. With a sawmill small enough to move
from tract to tract, the Zehmers acquired heavily forested properties
to harvest timber and moved their mill quickly from one property to
98
the next. This process led the Zehmers to acquire substantial land
holdings around the outskirts of what became McKenney, solidifying
99
their influence as a prominent family in the small town.
This business had a natural limit, and the family looked to use its
land holdings for alternative businesses once the local railroad line
had been established. In the 1920s, the family began to farm
100
101
tobacco, a profitable cash crop at the time. Less than twenty years
later, they supplemented their income by raising cattle, a business
102
that was naturally followed by dairy farming. As each business
92. McKenney was a University of Virginia law graduate and former congressman from
Petersburg. See McKenney, William Robertson (1851–1916), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF
THE U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M000502 (last
visited Mar. 19, 2012) (providing biographical information about McKenney).
93. See Our First 100 Years, BANK OF MCKENNEY, http://www.bankofmckenney.com/index
.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=54 (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (noting
that McKenney was an attorney for various railroads).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See generally ZEHMER, supra note 91 (listing the businesses established by the
Zehmers).
97. Id. § 8, at 10–11 (recording the expansion of the Zehmer farm).
98. See id. § 8, at 11 (noting that there were numerous sawmill sites on the farm).
99. See id. § 8, at 10–11 (recording increased acquisitions).
100. See id. § 7, at 7. (“Two log, flue-cured tobacco barns, built around 1920, stand near the
main entrance . . . .”).
101. See id. § 8, at 12 (“[T]he primary farming enterprise on the farm was tobacco as a cash
crop . . . .”).
102. Id. § 8, at 13.
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reached what seemed like its natural limit, other family businesses
were established, including a local grocery store, a local hardware
103
store, and, ultimately, Ye Olde Virginnie, the small “tourist court”
104
operated by Hardy Zehmer.
105

Image 1. Hardy Zehmer’s Tourist Court

Hardy Zehmer was a farmer born into a well-landed farming
family, but he also was an educated businessman, attending southern
106
Virginia’s prestigious Hampden-Sydney College and then briefly
working for E. I. du Pont de Nemours as the foreman of a munitions
107
plant during World War I. After the war, Zehmer returned to
103. Id. § 8, at 11.
104. See Ye Olde Virginnie, The One Stop Tourist Court (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). A postcard uncovered by Professor Frank Snyder describes the business as “The One
Stop Motel” in McKenney, Virginia, with “Individual and Family-type rooms—Air
conditioned—Steam Heat—Television—Restaurant—Service Station—Garage.” See Frank
Snyder, Carry Me Back to Ye Olde Virginnie, CONTRACTS PROF BLOG (Feb. 15, 2008), http://
lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2008/02/carry-me-back-t.html.
105. Photograph provided by Ronald Seagrave. Original source unknown.
106. Both Justice Buchanan and Judge Jefferson attended Hampden-Sydney College. See
VIRGINIA LIVES, supra note 64, at 132.
107. See Adrian Hardy Zehmer, Registration Card No. 4107 (1917) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (recording Zehmer’s place of employment). At the time, the large gun cotton
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conduct business in his native McKenney, where he quickly
108
established a restaurant, service station, motel, and guest cabins.
These assorted business ventures primarily catered to travelers along
Highway 1, the main north-south thoroughfare connecting Maine to
Florida at the time, and were profitable even during the Depression,
when so many other local businesses failed. As a measure of his
success, Zehmer, in a period when many were losing their farms, had
enough disposable income to buy the Ferguson farm, a property that
109
Zehmer had no desire to operate for commercial purposes.
In spite, or perhaps because, of Zehmer’s wealth, he had a lessthan-sterling reputation among McKenney’s residents and is
remembered as having been a colorful character. As one neighbor
recounted, Zehmer was known for his drinking even before that
fateful December evening in 1952 and had had several reported run110
ins with state and local officials. He also was the town’s leading
Republican in an age in which most town residents may still have
thought of the Republican Party as the party of Presidents Lincoln
and Hoover. The reasons for Zehmer’s political allegiances are not
entirely clear, but his politics made Zehmer a relative outcast in town
despite the prominence of his family. This disaffection was evidently
mutual: Hardy and Ida Zehmer evidently did not consider themselves
111
to be “McKenney people,”
and many McKenney residents
112
reportedly felt a similar distance from the Zehmers. Perhaps one

factory in Hopewell “employed almost all of the employable labor in that area.” Hercules
Powder Co. v. Cont’l Can Co., 86 S.E.2d 128, 129 (Va. 1955).
108. Snyder, supra note 104.
109. See Record, supra note 20, at 24, 41 (providing Ida and Hardy Zehmer’s deposition
testimony that, at most, several cows had been kept on the farm). A member of the Zehmer
family also confirmed Hardy Zehmer’s wealth and that he had held the farm as an investment
rather than as an active business asset. Telephone Interview with a Zehmer Family Member
(Nov. 23, 2010).
110. Interview with Floyd M. Harrison Jr., in Dinwiddie Cnty., Va. (Oct. 15, 2009)
(recounting stories about times Zehmer’s liquor license had been suspended for excessive
drinking behind the bar and a time Zehmer, while visiting a friend who called out the local fire
department, supposedly told the arriving firemen that “the fire [was] in [his] belly”).
111. Record, supra note 20, at 27 (“[W]e are out of the corporate limits, and I don’t have too
much contact with McKenney people.” (quoting Ida Zehmer)).
112. See SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 14, at 5 (reporting that the Zehmers “were not ‘wellliked’” in their community (quoting one of Professor Scott’s students who was from Dinwiddie
County)).
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should not be surprised then that Zehmer primarily directed his
113
businesses toward those only passing through town.
The Lucy brothers came from a world far away from the
Zehmers’ privilege. Though also born into a farming family—their
father ran a tobacco farm—the Lucy brothers lost everything when
their father’s farm went bankrupt in the early years of the
Depression; and the five Lucy children were left to fend for
114
themselves. John Cleveland Lucy, Welford’s older brother and a
coplaintiff, never finished the seventh grade and went to work in the
115
lumber industry as a teenager. Eventually scraping together enough
money to buy a small sawmill, John enjoyed the freedom that came
from running his own business, even though he took on an occasional
116
partner on larger projects.
In his early years, John bought and cut timber from the land of
local farmers, financing the purchases with loans and then selling the
cut timber to local lumber companies at a profit. From the start, he
relied on one institution in particular—the Farmers and Merchants
Bank—to finance most of his activities. His agreements with that
bank were in turn drawn up by the bank’s attorney and one of its
trustees at the time, a young commonwealth attorney named Albertis
117
S. Harrison Jr. The bank’s trust in John’s business grew over time,
as evidenced by the large number of loans it issued to Lucy and his

113. Whatever the reasons for this mutual distaste, whether it was shared by the Lucy
brothers is unclear. Indeed, John C. Lucy Jr., the son of coplaintiff John C. Lucy, fondly
remembers dining at Zehmer’s restaurant as a child and thinking of Hardy Zehmer as “a very
pleasant man.” Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, in Durham,
N.C. (July 16, 2009). If the Lucy brothers personally disliked Hardy Zehmer, such feelings were
not voiced to the rest of their family, leaving the ironic possibility that, at least on the surface,
the Lucy brothers might have been among the few in the area with a positive view of Hardy
Zehmer.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Email from John C. Lucy III to author (Feb. 17, 2011, 12:56 AM) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (containing comments from Emory Lucy explaining that the “vast majority
of [John C. Lucy’s] dealings were done on his own” but naming Clyde Delbridge and Shorty
Jones as two business partners).
117. A commonwealth attorney is the local equivalent of a district attorney in Virginia. See
BUREAU OF MUN. RESEARCH, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA: REPORT ON A SURVEY OF THE CITY
GOVERNMENT 455 (1917) (stating that the commonwealth attorney was “the prosecuting officer
of the City of Richmond”). Over the course of his career, Harrison continued to serve as a
trustee for the Farmers and Merchants Bank. Indeed, his name is listed as trustee on so many
trust deeds that Brunswick County has an entire Grantee Deed Index just for the Harrison
family. The Grantee Deed Index is on file with the Duke Law Journal.

RICHMAN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1536

3/20/2012 12:32 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1511

118

brothers over the next two decades. For many years, John even sat
119
on the bank’s board along with Harrison.
Welford, unlike his brother, was not content remaining in his
native Brunswick County. Instead, he looked further north to
neighboring Dinwiddie County, at first driving a truck for a local
120
businessman and then getting into lumber and cattle farming. In the
1940s, he purchased an estate along Highway 1, not too far from
121
Zehmer’s tourist court. This change marked the first time, but not
the last time, that Welford would feel the need to move to a new
122
community to pursue new business opportunities.
Welford arrived in McKenney as an outsider, and although he
would become a close associate of several residents—including
Harrison Zehmer, a cousin of Hardy Zehmer who would often spend
123
his evenings at Hardy’s restaurant —views vary as to whether
Welford ever integrated himself into the area. Some residents recall
that Lucy was known to be shady with his business and that—like
124
many of the county’s lumbermen at the time —he was eager to make

118. At the same time, Emory Lucy, one of John C. Lucy’s sons, insists that tracking his
father’s timber-cutting business just by tracking these loans would be difficult. Instead, he
believes that his father usually paid for timber to be harvested in cash and only took loans when
absolutely necessary. Interview with Emory Lucy, in Brunswick Cnty., Va. (Oct. 27, 2009).
119. Despite his humble roots, John C. Lucy saw himself as a gentleman. When heading out
to work in the field, John always wore a full suit, complete with a bow tie. Interview with John
C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113. As one of his sons recalls, he
even wore the suit for breakfast. Id. Beyond business at the bank, John C. Lucy also developed
a close bond with Albertis S. Harrison. Id. Although the poorly educated businessman might
seem a strange match with the well-educated lawyer, John’s descendants recall that the two men
were close personal friends. Id. The two regularly played golf together, and John C. Lucy in
particular was a true believer in Harrison and his political skill. Id. Emory Lucy, one of John’s
sons (who had served as a driver for Harrison during one of his early political campaigns),
recalls that his father sagely predicted that Harrison would be elected governor long before
Harrison’s victory in 1962. Interview with Emory Lucy, supra note 118. A loyal Democrat,
Welford was similarly supportive of Harrison’s political ambitions. Welford’s Dinwiddie farm
had a large barbeque pit with picnic tables where he hosted political fundraisers for Harrison
during each election season. Interview with Meade Lucy, in Durham, N.C. (Dec. 10, 2010).
120. Interview with Meade Lucy, supra note 119.
121. Id.
122. See infra Postscript.
123. Interview with Floyd M. Harrison Jr., supra note 110.
124. Although Justice Buchanan described Lucy as a “lumberman and farmer,” Lucy v.
Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 518 (Va. 1954), Lucy’s actual deposition testimony emphasized his
lumber business, only including “some farming” as though it was an afterthought, Record, supra
note 20, at 51.
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125

quick profits off of the land of others.
Although Hardy Zehmer may have prided himself on his
superior education and business acumen, the region’s economic
changes were being driven by market forces that extended far beyond
Zehmer’s tourist court. As we discuss in the next Part, these
economic changes created new profit opportunities for the
undereducated but enterprising Lucy brothers, who, despite starting
with only a small mill, played a significant role in the timber
economies of Dinwiddie and Brunswick Counties during a period of
significant industrial expansion.
III. TIMBER PRICES, LAND DISPUTES, AND AN
INDUSTRIAL SHIFT IN THE SOUTH
When John C. Lucy began his career as a lumberman in the
1930s, economic trends that had begun in the 1920s and that had
accelerated throughout the 1950s were rapidly changing the business
of lumbermen across the American South. During much of this
period, the lumber industry of southern Virginia—the region’s
126
traditional driver of prices for raw-timber resources —was waning in
127
the face of declining demand for southern pine. Yet far from

125. When asked, for instance, whether Welford’s reputation was hurt by the dispute in
Lucy v. Zehmer, one neighbor—Floyd M. Harrison Jr.—responded with a bluntness
characteristic of Dinwiddie residents: “What reputation?” Interview with Floyd M. Harrison Jr.,
supra note 110. Welford’s youngest son, Meade Lucy, saw a different side to his father,
describing Welford as a complicated man who was strict and a bit distant at home but friendly
and outgoing with most people in the community. Interview with Meade Lucy, supra note 119.
As his son recalls, Welford was the kind of person who “never met a stranger.” Id.
126. In forestry, “timber” is the raw tree that is harvested. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1172 (1st ed. 1891) (defining “timber” as “[w]ood felled for building or other such use”). Trees
in the field are often referred to as “standing timber.” See, e.g., Roberts v. Nevel, 140 S.E. 557,
559 (Va. 1927) (interpreting a contract that used the phrase “standing timber”). “Lumber,” by
contrast, is a finished product intended for use by an end consumer, such as in the term “lumber
boards.” See, e.g., id. (explaining the “clear and definite” technical definition of the term
“lumber” as distinct from the “loose, inaccurate verbiage of the layman”). Although lumber was
the main product made from timber in the South, making other products (such as “wood pulp”)
is possible as well. See 7 JOHN GRIMES WALKER, REPORT ON THE ISTHMIAN CANAL
COMMISSION, 1899–1901, at 522–23 (1904) (noting that the Southern states “furnish[ed] more
than half of the lumber exported from the United States” but that wood-pulp mills were “mostly
located in the northeastern part of the United States”). “Wood pulp,” in turn, can be used to
produce paper. Id. at 522.
127. See, e.g., I. James Pikl, Jr., Southern Forest-Products and Forestry: Developments and
Prospects, 42 J. FARM ECON. 268, 269–71 (1960) (describing the decline in “[l]arge-scale
lumbering operations” in the South from 1909 to 1958 and the declining demand for southern
pine due to complaints about its quality).
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slowing down, business was heating up for lumbermen in the region,
as industrial leaders addressed weak markets for lumber by investing
heavily in plants to make wood pulp, a valuable raw material used to
128
produce paper. The new capacity for paper manufacturing made
harvesting timber for wood pulp quite lucrative, which in turn created
129
a shock to local timber prices. Demand for timber spiked as
companies sought to acquire more timberlands to guarantee their
130
timber supplies, and speculation over timberlands spread. This
economic boom provides the context essential to understanding the
131
1952 encounter in Zehmer’s restaurant.
A. When the Farmer Met the Lumberman: Timber’s Early Years
The lumber industry has deep roots in southern Virginia, dating
132
back to at least 1855. Home to many dense forests—and good soil
for quickly growing pine forests—southern Virginia was a natural
133
attraction for lumbermen. Whereas early sawmills were isolated
outposts in an agrarian economy dominated by tobacco plantations,
the Civil War soon transformed the lumber industry into a more
powerful force. After the war, farmers devastated by the collapse of
tobacco and cotton prices were desperate to recover some value from
effectively defunct family farms and plantation lands. Although
timberlands were valueless to Southern farmers, Northern
lumbermen had the machinery and the know-how to harvest and
134
bring timber to market. Native Virginians soon took to the lumber
industry as well, realizing that they could pay only a pittance for

128. See id. at 272 (describing how pulp-and-paper products were displacing lumber
interests in the South).
129. See infra Part III.B.
130. See infra Part III.B.
131. See infra Part IV.
132. See PARKE ROUSE JR., THE TIMBER TYCOONS: THE CAMP FAMILIES OF VIRGINIA
AND FLORIDA AND THEIR EMPIRE 1887–1987, at 31 (1988) (“[T]he largest and most desirable
sawmill in southern Virginia . . . . was . . . owned by the brothers R. J. and William Neely,
formerly of Pennsylvania. It had been started in 1855 by John Frisbee and had shipped lumber
as far as Düsseldorf and Hamburg.”).
133. See id. at 35 (“Nowhere in the world did pine grow better than in the sandy region
south of the James River in Virginia, beginning at Richmond and extending southward to the
Neuse River in North Carolina.”).
134. See id. at 29 (“To meet the demand for timber, a wave of Northern sawmill operators
had swept into Virginia after 1865. With forest lands selling for as little as $5 an acre, venturers
set up many sawmills and began to produce both rough-hewn and finished lumber.”).
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woodlands and then earn back the purchase price after the first
135
harvest of timber.
“As a rule,” the circuit court of Brunswick County later wrote,
“the farmer welcomed the lumberman, who came to buy something
136
which, heretofore had never been convertible into ready cash.”
Faced with willing sellers of “immense quantities of timber,”
lumbermen proceeded “to erect large and expensive plants and to
137
build railroads into the territory where the timber stood.” Within a
few decades, the local lumber industry was recognized as “one of the
138
most important industries of Virginia and of the South.”
Investments in extracting southern pine for lumber also paved
the way for follow-on industries that similarly relied on harvesting
southern pine, including the important paper-and-pulp industry.
Paper production began in the South as early as 1878, when the
Marietta Paper Manufacturing Company of Georgia demonstrated
139
that paper could be produced from southern pine, and in 1891 the
Carolina Fibre Company of South Carolina went one step further by
proving that manufacturing paper from southern-pine wood pulp
140
could be commercially viable. Although these two plants stood
largely alone for several decades, pulp-and-paper plants had been
141
built across the region by the 1920s. The lumbermen of Virginia
142
assumed a leading role in these developments, and by 1927, Virginia
143
companies led the South in annual paper output.

135. See id. at 36 (“[Paul Camp of the Camp Manufacturing Company] bought [land] for as
little as $5 and $10 an acre, often repaying the land costs by the sale of its first timber.”).
136. Camp Mfg. Co. v. Young, 14 Va. L. Reg. 89, 99 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1908), rev’d in part, 66 S.E.
843 (Va. 1910).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. H.J. Malsberger, The Pulp and Paper Industry in the South, 54 J. FORESTRY 639, 639
(1956).
140. Id.
141. D.H. Killeffer, Paper Goes South, 30 INDUS. & ENGINEERING CHEMISTRY 1110, 1111
(1938).
142. See, e.g., DIANA TWEDE & SUSAN E.M. SELKE, CARTONS, CRATES, AND
CORRUGATED BOARD: HANDBOOK OF PAPER AND WOOD PACKAGING TECHNOLOGY 58
(2005) (noting that the plant established by the Hummel-Ross Fibre Company in Hopewell
began producing kraft linerboard commercially in 1923); Lauren B. Hitchcock, Cellulose in
Virginia: I—Pulp and Paper, 22 INDUS. & ENGINEERING CHEMISTRY 488, 489 (1930)
(referencing a plant jointly operated by the John H. Heald Company and the Mead Paperboard
Company in Lynchburg that, shortly before 1930, had expanded into the paper industry);
Chesapeake Corporation, FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/companyhistories/Chesapeake-Corporation-Company-History.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2012)
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B. The Post-World War II Boom
144

Virginia ranked fifth in national output of wood pulp in 1937,
and although the state’s pulp-and-paper industries still lagged behind
some Northern states, many Virginia companies invested their
145
wartime profits in paper manufacturing to close that gap. Efforts to
build up the region’s paper manufacturing accelerated when paper
demand soared—and lumber demand slumped again—after World
War II. In 1951, for example, the Camp Manufacturing Company
invested $2.5 million to build a new paper plant at its Franklin mill
146
that drastically increased the company’s production capacities. Only
three years later, the company allocated another $34 million to
147
purchase new paper machines for those operations. Even companies
from industries not traditionally tied to timber were investing in the
newly profitable industry. These new market entrants included the

(discussing the plant opened by the Chesapeake Pulp & Paper Company in West Point, east of
Richmond).
143. Hitchcock, supra note 142, at 489.
144. Sven A. Anderson, Trends in the Pulp and Paper Industry, 18 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 195,
199 (1942). Actual paper production lagged behind wood-pulp production because the early
Virginia wood-pulp plants were located in Hampton Roads, where shipping lanes provided easy
access to Northern markets. See Hitchcock, supra note 142, at 489 (“Convenience to both
northern and southern markets and, through Hampton Roads, to world markets encourages the
manufacture of any paper commodity whose production is not limited by remote sources of lowcost bulky raw materials.”). Likewise, many older mills in the Northern states did not make
their own pulp, relying instead on other sources like the ones in Virginia. See Anderson, supra,
at 200 (“Many paper mills do not produce their own pulp, but purchase it from various sources.
In normal times the mills of eastern United States rely very largely upon imported Canadian,
Scandinavian, and Finnish pulp for their requirements.”).
145. See Pikl, supra note 127, at 272 (“With more than two-thirds of the nation’s postwar
additions to pulping capacity taking place in the South, by 1958 the region was able to boast of
producing 60 per cent of the country’s woodpulp and more than 40 per cent of its paper and
paperboard.”).
146. Cf. ROUSE, supra note 132, at 161 (“Success in kraft papermaking led Camp
Manufacturing Company, Inc., in 1951 to build a $2,500,000 plant at Franklin to produce white
paper from pine. It was another step upward. Housewives preferred white rather than brown
cartons for milk and frozen foods, and the new white paper technique opened up new
markets.”).
147. See id. at 7–8 (“Hugh Camp delayed moving his residence . . . to complete installation
of the No. 4 paper machine the Camp board had initiated at his behest in 1954. The huge $34million machine dwarfed the three installed earlier . . . . In 1966, after Hugh had become [Union
Camp’s] chairman, the Franklin mill added its machine No. 5 at a cost of $37 million.”). By 1955,
observers were already referring to the lumber company as merely the operator of a “paper
mill” without any mention of its continuing lumber operations. See, e.g., Camp v. Murray, 226
F.2d 931, 932 (4th Cir. 1955).
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148

Continental Can Company, which purchased a plant in 1947 and
then invested between $22 million and $25 million to increase the
149
plant’s capacity four years later.
These investments caused pulp-and-paper operations to expand
quickly across the South, which by the mid-1950s was home to three150
Paper
fifths of the nation’s paper manufacturing capacity.
manufacturers suddenly found their timber inventories understocked
and sought to expand their woodland holdings quickly to meet
growing manufacturing demands. The Camp Manufacturing
Company, for example, expanded its local woodland holdings from
151
approximately 106,000 acres in 1936 to 240,000 acres twenty years
152
Other companies, including many that brought new
later.
technologies and greater efficiency to paper production, similarly
153
sought to acquire more timberlands.
Demand for timber was such that state officials and
manufacturers began fearing an imminent timber shortage in
154
southeastern Virginia. Timber harvesting and pulp processing were
148. As its name suggests, the Continental Can Company was primarily a metal-container
company. See United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 445 (1964) (noting that in 1955 the
company was “the second largest company in the metal container field,” but that it had also
acquired numerous other packaging companies, including fourteen separate “producers of
paper containers and paperboard”).
149. Hercules Powder Co. v. Cont’l Can Co., 86 S.E.2d 128 (Va. 1955).
150. See Merle Prunty, Jr., Recent Expansions in the Southern Pulp-Paper Industries, 32
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 51, 51 (1956) (“In 1944, the South was responsible for about 44 per cent of
domestic pulpwood output. By 1952, total southern production . . . accounted for 58 per cent of
all United States pulpwood cut. [P]roduction [in 1953] increased to . . . 61 per cent of domestic
production.”); see also supra note 145.
151. Camp Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 3 T.C. 467, 468 (1944). In addition to owned land, the
company also had 15,000 acres of contractual timber rights. Id.
152. ROUSE, supra note 132, at 5.
153. See id. (“[L]and and timber in the Southern pine belt were growing rapidly in value in
the 1950s . . . .”); id. at 12 (“[Franklin’s] employment in lumber and paper manufacturing has
steadily prospered. . . . Timber values have increased, and the purchase of raw materials of all
sorts, especially timber and pulpwood, has expanded as more and more high-technology
machines are brought on line.”).
154. See Hercules Powder Co., 86 S.E.2d at 131 (“Mr. George W. Dean, State Forester of
Virginia, testified that the pine situation was ‘acute’, and that on the basis of the latest survey of
Virginia forests conducted in 1952 by the United States and Virginia Forest Services, the drain,
or decrease in the Virginia pine, exceeded the growth of pine since 1940 by 16%.”); see also S.J.
Res. 22, 1954 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1954), reprinted in FOREST RESOURCES OF
VIRGINIA: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OF VIRGINIA 7, 7 (1955) (recognizing that “the volume of merchantable timber in Virginia ha[d]
been shown by recent surveys to have declined at an alarming rate” and creating a commission
to investigate the decline and develop recommendations for practices and regulatory measures
that might alleviate the situation).
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proceeding at such a rate that mills were attracting new workers faster
155
than the area’s housing supply could keep pace. The rise in demand
for timber led to a dramatic rise in timber prices, which naturally led
to a corresponding escalation of land prices across the southern pine
156
belt. By then, the pulp-and-paper industry was already on its way to
157
becoming the third-largest producer of wealth in the South. Thus,
despite rising land and timber prices, the industry continued
purchasing vast quantities of timber, investing in new timberlands,
and even increasing processing capacity.
158

Figure 1. Rapid Increase in Market Price for Southern Pine

155. See Camp v. Murray, 226 F.2d 931, 932 (4th Cir. 1955) (“The post war increase of the
[Camp Manufacturing Company] in 1947 led the company to bring many new employees to
Franklin and a critical shortage of house sites arose because none were available in the town
and the adjacent lands were owned by members of the Camp and other families who declined to
sell.”). In 1948, under increasing pressure, Hugh G. Camp, a company vice president, was
reluctantly persuaded to sell his own personal farmland to be used as residential land for town
newcomers and Camp’s new workers. Id. at 931–32.
156. See supra note 153. The market value of the Ferguson farm appears to have mirrored
these trends. In 1938, a judicial sale priced the farm at $3600. Deed, supra note 60, at 600, 600.
In 1943, Zehmer purchased it for $11,000. See Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 518 (Va. 1954)
(“[Zehmer] bought this farm more than ten years ago for $11,000.”); Record, supra note 20, at
56 (acknowledging that Ferguson had conveyed the deed to Zehmer in 1943). About three years
later, Lucy—in his first attempt to purchase the farm—offered Zehmer $20,000. See Lucy, 84
S.E.2d at 518 (“Seven or eight years ago [Lucy] had offered Zehmer $20,000 for the farm which
Zehmer had accepted, but the agreement was verbal and Zehmer backed out.”). In 1952, the
allegedly agreed-upon price was $50,000. Id. at 517.
157. See Malsberger, supra note 139, at 639 (“The pulp and paper business in the
South . . . rank[ed] as about the third largest wealth producer [in 1956].”).
158. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RESOURCE BULLETIN NO. FPL 11, TRENDS IN ECONOMIC
SCARCITY OF U.S. TIMBER COMMODITIES 4 (1982), available at http://www.fpl.fs.fed.us/
documnts/fplrb/fplrb11.pdf (listing prices in 1967 dollars for one thousand board feet of timber).
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As these companies pursued standing timber across vast new
tracts of land, they recognized the potential public outcry in
communities encroached upon by the paper industry’s expanding
159
reach. For a variety of reasons, the industry ultimately followed a
business model that relied on middlemen to obtain the timber
resources necessary to sustain its tremendous growth—a strategy that
would eventually bring Lucy and Zehmer face-to-face over drinks a
few nights before Christmas in 1952.
C. Southern Industry and Southern Law: The Rise of the Timber
Broker
Almost from the very beginning of the South’s lumber and paper
industries, the law played an important role in determining industrial
profits and, subsequently, in shaping the business strategies of large
mill operators.
As the lumber industry took hold at the beginning of the
twentieth century, it confronted a serious logistical challenge that
stymied its growth. The local pattern of landownership was highly
decentralized, with most timberlands belonging to small family
landholders, and thus posed considerable obstacles to mill operators’
ability to access the region’s forests. In 1908, the circuit court of
Brunswick County described the problem: “the territory in southside
Virginia is so divided into ownerships of small tracts, that it is

159. The feared outcry could be compared to the similar political agitation and revolts
caused by the English enclosure movements between the thirteenth and nineteenth centuries.
As Professor Allison Dunham suggests, early enclosure movements in England were less
controversial, and less forceful, than later efforts:
[G]iven the apparent economic desirability of consolidation of agricultural operations
in England, the destruction of the system of villages and fields and the voluntary
allocation of the rural land of England to consolidated argricultural [sic] uses resulted
from the normal operation of the market mechanism. Consents were obtained by
purchase and the self-interest of the farmers.
Allison Dunham, From Rural Enclosure to Re-Enclosure of Urban Land, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1238, 1241–42 (1960). By the late eighteenth century, however, the amount of land being
enclosed led some local farmers to resist enclosure efforts even when market forces offered
strong incentives for farmers to agree to them. As Dunham explains,
Rural conservatism, as some of the English literature described it, finally produced a
situation where not all of those who had rights to pasture in the common waste land
would consent to its enclosure, or at least consent at prices which the majority, even
given the economic advantage of enclosure, could afford to pay.
Id. at 1242.
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necessary to purchase from hundreds of farmers in order to justify the
160
erection of a modern saw-mill plant.”
The region’s large mill operators handled the problem of
decentralized land ownership by negotiating a web of standard
contracts securing the right to harvest and transport standing timber
161
from hundreds of small property owners. Although individual
contracts often involved small quantities of timber, litigation over
even the smallest timber deeds consumed a considerable amount of
162
time for large mill operators. The widespread use of standard
timber contracts also often raised large operators’ stakes in even the
smallest disputes because an unfavorable precedent affecting the
interpretation of key contract provisions could provide ammunition
to other farmers seeking similar redress—multiplying the company’s
potential losses well beyond the amount of timber on any single
163
farm.
Early on, Virginia’s highest court appeared unsympathetic to
these concerns. In 1910, for example, the Virginia Supreme Court
chided the circuit court in Brunswick for taking “judicial notice of the
164
operations of a large manufacturing concern” and showing undue
deference to a large mill operator because of its importance to the
165
local economy. Perhaps because of these challenges, some mill
operators soon began purchasing local timberlands outright rather

160. Camp Mfg. Co. v. Young, 14 Va. L. Reg. 89, 99 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1908), rev’d in part, 66 S.E.
843 (Va. 1910).
161. See generally id. (noting the importance of contracts with individual farmers to the
paper business).
162. See, e.g., ROUSE, supra note 132, at 48 (“Like other lumber-cutters, Camp was
frequently in court in cases contesting the boundaries of its timberlands. Such litigation usually
grew out of ill-defined property lines on recorded land plats, some dating back to colonial years.
Often such landmarks as large trees cited by early surveyors had disappeared, creating
confusion. Especially troublesome was legal title to remote woodlands, . . . which had rarely
been timbered.”).
163. Young, 14 Va. L. Reg. at 90 (explaining that two consolidated test cases were
particularly important because the questions raised about the standard timber deeds used by the
Camp Manufacturing Company involved “principles which can arise in more than one hundred
other cases, and which will settle the title to standing timber valued at perhaps more than one
million dollars”).
164. Id.
165. See Young v. Camp Mfg. Co., 66 S.E. 843, 847–48 (Va. 1910) (“[W]e cannot think that
the rights of the appellants should be controlled by the magnitude of the business in which the
Camp Manufacturing Company is engaged. . . . [T]he rights of appellants are not to be measured
by the convenience or inconvenience, the ability or the inability, of the Camp Manufacturing
Company, caused by and resulting from the magnitude and extent of its business, and its
numerous other contracts to which these appellants are strangers.”).
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than purchasing the standing timber on these properties. But even
167
land purchases brought litigation risks.
Anticipating the hazards from litigation, and hoping to avoid
further cumbersome relations with local landowners, mill operators
such as the Camp Manufacturing Company began to rely increasingly
on local family-owned lumber companies to supply their timber
168
needs. These lumbermen worked as middlemen to help the mill
operators acquire timber rights in peripheral regions without
169
alarming local residents. When legal disputes arose, these local
170
middlemen also presented the courts with more sympathetic parties.
Relying on local lumbermen had the additional benefit of keeping
land acquisitions quiet, which proved to be useful when land was
undervalued. The use of middlemen transformed the industry’s
structure and had meaningful consequences for the region’s smaller
lumbermen, including the Lucy brothers.

166. See generally CAMP MFG. CO., SIXTY YEARS OF PROGRESS (1948) (detailing the
company’s boasts that by the late 1940s, Camp’s lumber and paper operations relied almost
exclusively on timber cut from repeated harvests on company-owned lands).
167. See Camp Mfg. Co. v. Green, 106 S.E. 394, 400 (Va. 1921) (holding that a suit against
Camp Manufacturing Company was only prevented by the lapse of time between the injury and
the action); Seward v. Camp Mfg. Co., 71 S.E. 614, 617 (Va. 1911) (concluding that the Camp
Manufacturing Company had a right to some, but not all, of the land it had purchased).
168. See, e.g., Mitch Zemel, Va. Grows Growth Industry, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 10,
1990, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. 9002100828 (referencing the “many small logging
companies, which stay in business by getting contracts to cut trees from the . . . Union Camps of
the industry”).
169. Concerns about industrial landgrabs alarming local residents were far from
hypothetical. Rural communities were particularly sensitive to industry efforts to secure wide
swaths of farming territories. See Prunty, supra note 150, at 52–53 (“Despite efforts to avoid
undue local concentrations of ownership, some have occurred and criticism has resulted.”).
170. This strategy was apparently successful in shielding Camp Manufacturing Company
from litigation. In spite of the company’s several legal battles in the early 1900s, we could not
find a single Virginia Supreme Court case involving timber or land purchases to which the
Camp Manufacturing Company or its successor company, the Union-Camp Bag Company, was
a party from 1936 to 1956. An exhaustive search of cases in state and federal courts in the 1940s
and 1950s only turns up one case involving the Camp Manufacturing Company and disputed
rights to timber, heard before a federal district court in 1942 in South Carolina. See Nelson v.
Camp Mfg. Co., 44 F. Supp. 554, 557 (E.D.S.C. 1942) (considering a trespass action in which
Camp Manufacturing Company was the defendant). This is in spite of the company’s substantial
growth during that period; the company more than doubled its land ownership and timber
intake. See Camp Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 3 T.C. 467, 468 (1944) (“In 1936 petitioner owned in fee
approximately 106,000 acres of timber lands and held timber rights in 15,000 additional acres.”);
see also supra note 152 and accompanying text. Indeed, to our knowledge, none of the major
industrial leaders of the Southern pulp-and-paper industry litigated cases with farmers over
timber or land before the Virginia Supreme Court in those years.
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As the pulp-and-paper industry began to displace the lumber
industry in the late 1940s, it also inherited the lumber industry’s
problems. First and foremost among those problems was the region’s
divided land ownership. In the words of a contemporary source,
The small landowner is the key to the future of the pulp and
paper industry in the South. The industry does not own enough land
to support itself, and for the future it appears as though industry
must expect the small landowner to supply 50 percent of its total
requirements. This small landowner looms very large and important
171
whenever southern forestry is deliberated.

By the mid-1950s, pulp-and-paper manufacturers purchased 75
172
percent of their timber requirements from local landowners.
Industrial leaders grew increasingly aggravated, however, by the low
productivity of forests controlled by small landowners as compared to
173
lands owned by industrial interests, so pulp-and-paper companies
across the South preferred instead to acquire more direct control over
174
Southern timber and timberlands.
A second familiar problem was the farmers’ “sensitiv[ity] to the
175
manner in which markets for wood-stuffs conduct themselves.”
Thus, corporate leaders feared that sudden acquisitions of large tracts
of land, in addition to driving up purchase prices, would anger the
same local farmers upon whom they relied for a majority of their
176
timber resources. Mill owners of the 1950s, like their predecessors
forty years earlier, navigated these straits by trying to mask their
acquisitions of additional timberlands, both by looking to more

171. Malsberger, supra note 139, at 642.
172. See id. at 641 (noting, in a source dated 1956, that the industry bought 75 percent of its
raw materials on the open market). As late as 1990, these private-property owners were still
providing more than 70 percent of the timber required by Virginia’s timber-consuming
industries. Zemel, supra note 168.
173. See Malsberger, supra note 139, at 641 (comparing productivity rates for industrial
forests, rated as high as 96 percent, to the rates for individual tracts of land, rated as low as 40
percent).
174. See Prunty, supra note 150, at 52 (“Customarily these mills have obtained ownership
(or control through long-term leases) of sufficient nearby woodland to insure annual pulpwood
production equivalent to approximately one-third of mill requirements.”). These attempts were
ultimately successful. See Zemel, supra note 168 (noting that by 1990, “[m]any larger companies
rel[ied] heavily on their own timberland”).
175. Prunty, supra note 150, at 53.
176. This was more than a hypothetical fear. A local commentator observed that “[d]espite
efforts to avoid undue local concentrations of ownership, some have occurred and criticism has
resulted.” Id. at 52–53.
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remote sources of timber where their activities might arouse less
concern and by employing middlemen to conceal the true purposes of
land or timber transactions. A report issued by the state’s commission
on forest resources in 1955, for example, describes the rise of
“pulpwood contractors” who did “the great majority of cutting [of
timber] in Virginia . . . predominantly on small ownerships of farmers
177
These contractors—alternatively
and non-resident investors.”
178
described as “timber broker[s]” —formed networks of individual
lumbermen who acquired timber rights and then harvested timber for
the state’s large and rapidly expanding pulping operations. As such,
several small family-owned businesses whose core businesses
previously had been harvesting timber and producing lumber
products transformed themselves from independent manufacturers to
middlemen who profited by searching for and securing raw timber
179
materials for Virginia’s burgeoning pulpwood operations.
This strategy, when coupled with rapidly rising timber and
timberland prices, had the unintended result of inspiring an
unrestrained landgrab. The combination of rising land values and the
proliferation of aggressive middlemen led to an explosion of quickly
executed and wildly unseemly property sales. Many sales involved
shady practices and little disclosure, often causing family sellers to
agree to prices far below prevailing market rates. A study
commissioned by the Virginia legislature found the problem to be
sufficiently problematic to conclude that sawmill operators “ha[d]
taken full advantage of the landowner’s ignorance of timber
180
matters.” Several of these disputes over rapid land sales resulted in
litigation and left behind a colorful legal history.
D. The Timber Broker and the Courtroom
As early as the late 1920s, and especially in the booming 1940s
and 1950s, the Virginia Supreme Court regularly heard cases between
local landowners, individual lumbermen, and local lumber
181
companies. These cases often pitted neighbors, families, and even
177. FOREST RESOURCES OF VIRGINIA, supra note 154, at 28.
178. Owen v. Wade, 37 S.E.2d 759, 760 (Va. 1946).
179. See Zemel, supra note 168 (describing how small family businesses survived by
supplying large pulp-and-paper producers with timber).
180. FOREST RESOURCES OF VIRGINIA, supra note 154, at 50.
181. Between 1926 and 1957, the Virginia Supreme Court decided at least thirty-seven
cases—in addition to Lucy v. Zehmer—that involved disputes over timber or timberlands. See,
e.g., Barnes v. Moore, 98 S.E.2d 683, 687 (Va. 1957) (affirming a judgment of willful trespass
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former business partners against each other over the control of the
region’s trees and timberlands. Even the early history of the Ferguson
farm contributed to this line of land disputes. After M.L. Ferguson,
an elderly widow, bequeathed the property in nine equal shares to
members of her family, one of those family members, Dr. J.H.
182
Ferguson, offered to buy the remaining interests from the others.
Three ultimately agreed to sell, and Dr. Ferguson sued the remaining
183
five for their shares. Represented by William Earle White, a
prominent local attorney, Dr. Ferguson successfully persuaded the
court to order a judicial sale of the property in which he, in the “best
interest of all parties in interest,” would pay $2000 to be divided
184
between the five holdouts. Five years later, Dr. Ferguson sold the

against a neighbor who cut the plaintiff’s timber); Raney v. Barnes Lumber Corp., 81 S.E.2d
578, 586–87 (Va. 1954) (finding no contract between a plaintiff lumber company and the heirs to
an owner of timberlands); Goin v. Absher, 53 S.E.2d 50, 53 (Va. 1949) (overturning a trial court
judgment that a lumberman had properly exercised an option to extend a timber deed); Kiser v.
W.M. Ritter Lumber Co., 18 S.E.2d 319, 320 (Va. 1942) (reviewing an action by heirs to recover
damages from timber removal after a company entered a contract with an incapacitated
landowner); Brunswick Land Corp. v. Perkinson, 151 S.E. 138, 141 (Va. 1930) (affirming
trespass by a neighbor who removed trees from the plaintiff’s property); Morriss v. White, 131
S.E. 835, 840 (Va. 1926) (finding no cause of action for reimbursement of the value of timber
that had been removed before the property had been conveyed to the plaintiff). The North
Carolina Supreme Court heard similar cases. In Roberson v. Williams, 83 S.E.2d 811 (N.C.
1954), which occurred just across Virginia’s southern border, a lumberman—after repeatedly
trying to buy rights to timber on a widow’s farm, id. at 811—finally induced the widow to sell
those rights with assurances that $10,000 was a “good price,” id. at 814–15. Forty-nine days later,
the lumberman sold the same rights to a lumber company for nearly double that price. Id. at
811–12. When the widow discovered the difference in prices, she filed suit for actionable fraud.
Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court ultimately held that when a widow had been told that
she was being offered a “good price,” and those words had induced her to part with her
property for half its value, the widow was entitled to present her case to a jury. Id. at 811, 815.
182. Ferguson v. Ferguson (Va. Cir. Ct. Dinwiddie County 1938) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). This document is available on page 501 of the Dinwiddie County Chancery Order
Book No. 4.
183. Id.
184. Id. In resolving the suit, William Earle White was appointed special commissioner to
arrange the sale, which was accomplished by deed on December 14, 1938; pursuant to the sale,
Dr. Ferguson officially took control over the farm for the sum of $2000. See Deed, supra note
156, at 600–01 (“This deed, made this 14th day of December, in the year 1938, by and between
William Earle White, Special Commissioner, party of the first part, and J. H. Ferguson, party of
the second part. . . . Whereas, the court by a decree . . . accepted and confirmed the offer of J. H.
Ferguson for the purchase of the hereinafter described real estate for the sum of two thousand
dollars . . . .”). It should be noted that there was reportedly a “poor market for timber” in
1938—the year of the judicial sale. See Straley v. Fisher, 10 S.E.2d at 551, 552–54 (Va. 1940)
(explaining why a lumberman had not removed all the timber between February and December
1938, as he had been authorized to do under a contract).
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185

farm to Zehmer for $11,000.
Several other land disputes also resulted in lively litigation, and
one person who regularly was at the fore of that litigation was
Harrison. After becoming a state senator, but before his election as
Virginia’s attorney general, Harrison frequently represented parties
in disputes over southern Virginia land. Harrison, for instance, was
186
the lead defense attorney in Jackson v. Seymour, a case that has
187
appeared in textbooks for at least as long as Lucy v. Zehmer and
that has been cited to demonstrate principles related to
188
189
190
unconscionability,
fiduciary duties,
and constructive fraud.
Jackson involved a widow who, after having sold her family land to
her brother, discovered that her brother had profited handsomely
191
from harvesting timber on the land. After the brother refused to
share the profits with his sister—or even to disclose to her what those
profits had been, though it was later revealed that they approached
192
ten times the land’s sale price —that widow, Lucy S. Jackson,
193
retained an attorney to take her brother to court for fraud. After
Harrison successfully defended the contract at trial, Jackson appealed
to the Virginia Supreme Court, which—though agreeing with
Harrison that Jackson had failed to prove actual fraud—took pity on
the widow and ordered the contract rescinded and damages paid to

185. Deed, supra note 50, at 167; Record, supra note 20, at 34 (recording testimony from
Zehmer about how much he had paid when he originally bought the farm).
186. Jackson v. Seymour, 71 S.E.2d 181 (Va. 1952).
187. See PATTERSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 306 (discussing Jackson v. Seymour in a
casebook dated 1957).
188. See, e.g., Note, Unconscionable Business Contracts: A Doctrine Gone Awry, 70 YALE
L.J. 453, 453 & n.3 (1961) (citing Jackson v. Seymour as an example of “courts hav[ing]
protected widows and simpletons from the machinations of sharp traders by finding that gross
inadequacy of consideration has made a contract ‘unconscionable’ and therefore
unenforceable”).
189. See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1249 & n.241 (1983) (mentioning Jackson v. Seymour as an example of an
opinion that straddles the line between “treat[ing] a case as an arm’s-length transaction subject
to contract law” and “treat[ing] it as a relationship calling for the application of fiduciary
principles”).
190. See, e.g., Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Merchant of Section 2-314: Who Needs Him?,
34 HASTINGS L.J. 747, 748 n.8 (1983) (using Jackson v. Seymour to support the proposition that
“[t]he doctrine of constructive fraud requires a special relationship between the parties”).
191. Jackson, 71 S.E.2d at 182–84.
192. See id. at 183 (noting that Jackson received $275 for the land, that Seymour cut 148,055
feet of timber from his lands at a stumpage value of about twenty dollars per 1000 feet, and that
a majority of the timber came from the land he had purchased from Jackson).
193. Id. at 184.
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the plaintiff under a new cause of action known as constructive
194
fraud.
Several years later, Harrison was also the lead plaintiff’s attorney
195
in Barnes v. Moore, a case that arose out of negotiations over a tract
of property between two lumbermen, Barnes and Cabiness, and a
196
man named Love. Barnes, reportedly a “man of honesty and
197
integrity,”
was trolling Victoria County for timberlands with
198
Cabiness when the two “found Love near his home.” Eager to
purchase Love’s land, Cabiness “obtained a bottle of whiskey for
Love, and after the latter had taken a drink, they began
199
negotiations.” Eventually, they reached a deal, and the lumbermen
200
began cutting and removing the timber.
In a predictable plot twist, Barnes and Cabiness discovered that
201
Love did not actually own the property in question, and the real
landowners retained Harrison to sue the lumbermen for trespass for
202
taking timber from their lands. Harrison argued, and the Virginia
Supreme Court agreed, that the lumbermen had acted with gross
203
negligence. Noting that “Barnes and Love were kinsmen,” the court
chided Barnes for exploiting a member of his own community and for
204
doing business upon such shaky grounds. In the end, the court

194. Id. at 184–86.
195. Barnes v. Moore, 98 S.E.2d 683 (Va. 1957).
196. Id. at 684–85.
197. Id. at 686.
198. Id. at 685. The court was presumably referring to the incorporated town of Victoria in
Lunenburg County, Virginia, which is a one-hour drive from McKenney along State Highway
40. That route would take a visitor directly through the Ferguson farm because Highway 40 runs
directly across the property. Record, supra note 20, at 17.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 683–84.
203. Id. at 687. The justification for finding that the lumbermen had been grossly negligent
in swiftly executing such a land sale comes from the court’s description of Love:
He was eighty-two years of age, blind in one eye, with defective vision in the other,
and feeble both physically and mentally. He had given up his business affairs about
ten years ago, and such matters were attended to by his wife and other members of
his family. He was kindly disposed, addicted to drinking alcoholic beverages
whenever available, and easily influenced by other people, especially when
drinking. . . . These conditions surrounding Love were generally known in his
community.
Id. at 685–86.
204. Id. at 686–87.
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ordered the lumbermen to pay damages to the real landowners, and
Love suffered no consequences from enjoying his free drink.
In between these two representations, Harrison represented the
Lucy brothers in Lucy v. Zehmer. Together, the three cases paint a
colorful picture of disputed land sales between eager and, at times,
unscrupulous purchasers and landowners unaware of their land’s
unrealized value. They further illustrate how an economic shock to
asset prices can insert a wedge—and litigation—into intimate social
and family relations. The cases also suggest that Zehmer’s
negotiations with Lucy took place within a distinct economic context.
The region’s large industrial concerns created valuable economic
opportunities for land purchasers, and although many farmers were
unaware of the land’s worth, many others understood that the timber
they owned was rising in value. As the region’s mills used local
intermediaries to acquire timber resources, aggressive middlemen
trolling for land sales proliferated in the county’s farmlands and often
found themselves defending their business practices in court. As we
describe in the next Part, the Lucy brothers had a lucrative run
working as such middlemen, and their journey to the Virginia
Supreme Court began with a plan to obtain what they believed was
the crown jewel of Dinwiddie’s vast timber reserves: the aged
timberlands located on the Ferguson farm.
IV. NOT JUST A TALE OF TWO LUMBERMEN
In part, Lucy v. Zehmer is a tale of two brothers in southern
Virginia who, like the Camps—and even the Zehmers—before them,
made a fortune by buying undervalued forested properties in remote
areas and selling the timber from those properties for more money
than they had paid for the land as a whole. The Lucys’ rise to
prosperity, however, was a distinct reflection of the region’s
industrialization, as the brothers capitalized on the regional mills’
need for timber brokers. The brothers thus contributed to the
transformation of southern Virginia’s economy from one that relied
on farming to one that rested on harvesting natural resources for
industrial use.

205. Id. at 684, 687. These cases also demonstrate Harrison’s versatility as an attorney. In
Barnes v. Moore, Harrison represented landowners and convinced the Virginia Supreme Court
to rule against the allegedly irresponsible or unethical practices of timber harvesters. In Lucy v.
Zehmer, by contrast, Harrison convinced the same court that a contract should be upheld on
behalf of a timber harvester against a purportedly irresponsible landowner.
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A. The Secret to the Lucys’ Success
Property records reveal that the Lucy brothers signed dozens of
206
land and timber deeds between the 1930s and the 1960s. Though
generally involving properties smaller than the 471.6-acre Ferguson
farm, these deeds reflect a pattern of business activity in Dinwiddie
and Brunswick Counties: The Lucy brothers would purchase
farmland and then harvest the timber for sale to the Camp
Manufacturing Company or another large paper mill. Sometimes the
Lucys would resell the land after removing the timber, but often the
immediate returns from harvesting would enable the Lucys to keep
207
much of the land.
Engaging in such activity required a keen eye for “cruising,” the
process of strolling through a property to determine the value of its
timber, and the descendants of John and Welford Lucy described
208
Welford as a true master of the trade. Cruising usually involved
taking careful measurements of a land’s timber and making
calculations based on market prices, but Lucy family lore describes
Welford as someone who could stroll around a property and
209
intuitively make an accurate assessment of its value. In fact,
Welford admitted in a deposition that he had driven around Zehmer’s
property several times in the years prior to making his offer of
$50,000 in December 1952, including one trip three weeks before the
210
disputed sale. Those trips suggest that Welford’s eventual offer was
based on a reasoned analysis of the value of the property’s timber
rather than on an impulsive wager.
206. In Dinwiddie County alone, Welford and John C. Lucy are listed as grantees on at least
thirty-four separate land or timber deeds and as grantors on fifty-one such deeds. Indices of
these deeds are on file with the Duke Law Journal.
207. John C. Lucy’s descendants recalled that he, especially, saw value in accumulating as
much land as possible, instructing his sons, “Buy land if you can, because it is the one
commodity that God is no longer making.” Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III,
and James Lucy, supra note 113. By adhering to that philosophy, John C. Lucy was able to leave
thousands of acres of rural land to his sons when he passed away. Id.
208. Interview with Emory Lucy, supra note 118; Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C.
Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113; Interview with John C. Lucy III and John C. Lucy IV
(Feb. 16, 2007); Interview with Meade Lucy, supra note 119; see also Timber Cruising, U.S.
FOREST SERV., http://www.fs.fed.us/fmsc/measure/cruising/index.shtml (last updated Aug. 30,
2011) (“Cruising is the process of measuring forest stands to determine stand characteristics,
such as average tree sizes, volume, and quality. The primary purpose of cruising is to obtain a
volume estimation to appraise and prepare timber sales.”).
209. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113;
Interview with Meade Lucy, supra note 119.
210. Record, supra note 20, at 61–62.
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Lumbermen like the Lucys profited not only from intuitive
cruising but also from fostering continuing relationships with the
region’s mills. When the Camp Manufacturing Company needed to
expand its reach farther into Brunswick and Dinwiddie Counties, for
example, it turned to John C. Lucy and other lumbermen to purchase
211
new land and then turn over the timber. John first entered the
lumber business on his own, scraping together enough money for a
212
small sawmill. Before long, his descendants recalled, the Camp
Manufacturing Company had reached out to him to be their “wood
agent” in Brunswick County, offering him set prices for all timber
213
shipped. John’s frequent business with Camp led him to build a
lumberyard in Brunswick County from which he sent regular
214
shipments of timber to the company by train. It was a good business
215
John C. Lucy Jr. recalls; it was “just like picking money off trees.”
B. Answering the $50,000 Question
Both the region’s economic history and the parties’ personal
histories clarify the events that surrounded Lucy’s meeting with
Zehmer shortly before Christmas in 1952. They also help illuminate
the court’s determination that $50,000 was a fair price for the
Ferguson farm. Timber prices, and thus timberland prices, were
skyrocketing, and neither historic prices nor the tax assessment values
relied upon by the court accurately reflected appropriate timberland
values. In fact, the Ferguson farm’s history leading up to 1952 had
contributed to its growing value.
Owned by a widow, then by an absentee landlord, and then by
nonlumberman Zehmer, the farm’s forests had been allowed to grow
211. Interview with Emory Lucy, supra note 118; Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C.
Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113.
212. Interview with Emory Lucy, supra note 118; Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C.
Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113.
213. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113.
214. Interview with Emory Lucy, supra note 118. John C. Lucy Jr. believed that the
arrangement had begun with an oral contract under which Camp agreed to pay John C. Lucy
Sr., one dollar for every cord of pulp wood shipped each week. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr.,
John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113. He estimated that his father had been one of
Camp’s largest agents, sending between 50,000 and 60,000 cords of timber a year. Id. The
Virginia Department of Forestry defines a cord as the amount of wood contained in a space of
128 cubic feet when the pieces are stacked compactly in touching, parallel rows. Firewood for
Home Heating, VA. DEP’T OF FORESTRY, http://www.dof.virginia.gov/mgt/firewood.htm (last
visited Mar. 19, 2012). A “standard cord” measures four feet high, four feet wide, and eight feet
long. Id.
215. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113.
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unharvested for decades. As a result, the farm “was an excellent tract
216
of timber,” a fact supported by several depositions in the appellate
217
record. S.E. Winn Jr., a local sawmill operator, testified that he had
made several past attempts to buy the farm, including an attempt to
buy its timber in December 1952, shortly before Welford made his
218
offer. John Will Rives, a local game warden, reported having had “a
number of conversations” with Zehmer about “the saw timber” on
219
the property. Zehmer himself testified that he had turned down
220
twenty-five similar offers for the farm.
Welford and his brother, who were operating lucrative
businesses as timber brokers for southern Virginia’s large pulp-andpaper interests, were ideally positioned to capitalize on the land’s
value. They had a history of harvesting timber for paper companies
and of buying and selling timberlands for healthy profits, and their
business success was sufficient to give them access to credit lines that
221
were apparently beyond the imagination of Zehmer. They might
reasonably have been able to extract the most value from the farm,
and thus might have been able to offer a price sufficiently higher than
any competing broker—a price that would have surprised Zehmer.

216. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113. In
addition, one neighbor reports that the property was not particularly valuable as a farm, but that
it was valuable instead as a relatively untouched forest. Interview with Floyd M. Harrison Jr.,
supra note 110.
217. Record, supra note 20, at 82–85.
218. Id. at 82–83.
219. Id. at 84–85.
220. Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d. 516, 518 (Va. 1954). Zehmer testified that he had told Lucy
that he was turning down the offers because he “want[ed his] son to have [the farm].” Id. at 520
(quoting Zehmer). Zehmer’s insistence on leaving the lands untouched for his son could be seen
as a Zehmer family tradition, but more likely, Zehmer was retaining an asset growing in value
for when he or his son needed capital. Other family members also reportedly let their
timberlands sit except when funds were needed—for example, to pay the college tuitions of
their children. ZEHMER, supra note 91, § 8, at 11.
221. One neighbor, Floyd M. Harrison Jr., reports that Zehmer had thought Lucy was
bluffing about his ability to get $50,000, but that Zehmer had known that he had been cheated
as soon as Lucy came forward with the money. Interview with Floyd M. Harrison Jr., supra note
110. Another neighbor, who was at the other end of the counter at Ye Olde Virginnie when
Lucy met Zehmer in 1952, believes that Zehmer had known that Welford Lucy did not have the
money to back up his offer, but that Zehmer had forgotten about Welford’s brother, John
Cleveland. Telephone Interview with Roper Howard (Oct. 15, 2009). This explanation sits well
with John Cleveland’s descendants. See, e.g., Email from John C. Lucy III to author, supra note
116 (containing comments from Emory Lucy explaining that he “ha[d] always been under the
impression that [John Cleveland had] guaranteed a portion of the funds because Uncle Welford
could not come up with it on his own”).
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In addition, Lucy’s exceptional talent for appraising timber value
without conducting extensive measurements allowed him uniquely to
estimate the farm’s potential value. The record suggests that the
Zehmers, by contrast, thought little of the land’s natural resources—
or at least that they were much less attuned to the land’s timber value
than the nearby community of lumbermen. Ida and Hardy Zehmer,
for example, both testified that the farm had no equipment or value
except for the presence of a farmhouse and two head of cattle; they
said nothing to suggest that the property contained valuable natural
222
resources.
Viewing the conversation between Zehmer and Lucy through
this lens, one can understand why Zehmer might have thought that
$50,000 was an attractive price at first but changed his mind after
realizing that it was so agreeable to Lucy. Zehmer likely became
aware of his land’s potential value only after Lucy walked out of
Zehmer’s restaurant excitedly waving the restaurant receipt-cumcontract. Lucy’s zeal in enforcing the contract and Zehmer’s strong
resistance to selling are in tension with Justice Buchanan’s
proclamation that $50,000 was, if not a windfall for Zehmer, a fair
price for the land. A careful examination of Dinwiddie property
records provides reason to question the accuracy of Justice
Buchanan’s valuation.
Subsequent events reveal the true value of the Ferguson farm.
On December 17, 1954, Hardy and Ida Zehmer finally conveyed the
223
Ferguson farm to the Lucys for the bargained-for price of $50,000.
On January 5, 1955, less than a month after the final sale, the Lucy
brothers executed a timber deed granting the right to all the
merchantable timber on the property to the Lumber Distribution

222. A review of Ida Zehmer’s deposition testimony, for example, reveals a telling exchange
in which Harrison pushed Ida to describe objects of value on the property:
Q. What else did the word, “complete”, include other than the land and buildings
thereon?
A. I know of nothing else except the cows.
Q. There was no farming equipment on the property at the time?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. The property consisted of farm and buildings thereon? And two heads of cattle?
A. That is right.
Record, supra note 20, at 24. Harrison proceeded to ask Hardy Zehmer similar questions, and
he received similar answers. See id. at 41 (recording an exchange in which Harrison asked
whether “there [was] anything else [on the property] except a couple cows” and Zehmer
replied, “No, sir”).
223. Deed, supra note 25, at 365.
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224

Company of Petersburg, Virginia. To execute this purchase, the
Lumber Distribution Company borrowed $85,000, suggesting that at
225
least that much—and perhaps more—was paid to the Lucy brothers.
By April 1956, the Lumber Distribution Company had removed
all the merchantable timber from the formerly forested portions of
the property and had filed a deed of release, freeing the Lucy
brothers from their obligations under the contract and enabling them
226
to otherwise dispose of the property. Immediately thereafter,
Welford Lucy sold the formerly wooded portion of the property,
which amounted to 367.7 of the original 471.6 acres, to the
227
Continental Timber Lands Corporation,
an affiliate of the
228
Continental Can Company. Because the Continental Timber Lands
Corporation evidently had no need to secure financing for the
transaction, there is no public record of what Welford received in his
229
truncated sale of the property.
Following this sale, Welford leased the remaining 103.9 acres of
the Ferguson farm—the portion suitable for farming—to W. Franklin
Townsend, enabling Townsend to reside on the property as a tenant
farmer and granting him an option to buy the property for $12,000 as
230
early as 1961. On May 14, 1962, after Townsend had informed Lucy

224. Timber Deed (1955), in 91 DINWIDDIE COUNTY DEED BOOK 40, 40–42. Although this
deed was officially notarized on January 5, 1955, it may have been first drawn up even earlier.
For example, the agreement specifically grants the Lumber Distribution Company a period of
three years from December 21, 1954, to cut and remove the timber on the property. Id.
Presumably, this date was chosen for a reason. Id. at 41. Because the Lucy brothers only
received a deed for the property from the Zehmers on December 17, 1954, Deed, supra note 25,
at 365—a Friday—the brothers apparently had papers drafted to sell the property within two
business days of having received the deed.
225. This figure is the amount recorded in the trust deed filed by the Lumber Distribution
Company, which states the amount that the company had borrowed from the Petersburg
Savings and American Trust Company to finance the sale. Deed of Trust (1955), in 91
DINWIDDIE COUNTY DEED BOOK 44, 45. Ironically, one of Hardy Zehmer’s attorneys—
William Earle White—served as a trustee for the Petersburg bank in the transaction, id. at 46,
and would accordingly have been able to see how much the timber on his client’s farm was
worth shortly after his loss before the Virginia Supreme Court, see Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d
516, 516, 522–23 (Va. 1954) (deciding against Zehmer on November 22, 1952).
226. Deed of Release (1956), in 95 DINWIDDIE COUNTY DEED BOOK 71, 71–72.
227. Deed & Plat (1956), in 95 DINWIDDIE COUNTY DEED BOOK 72, 72–74.
228. Merger (1958), in 103 DINWIDDIE COUNTY DEED BOOK 402, 402.
229. Had the Continental Timber Lands Corporation borrowed finances to purchase the
tract, a bank would have filed a trust deed on the property, which would have provided a better
estimate of what Lucy received from the transaction. Despite an exhaustive search of local
records related to the parties and the property, no such deed has been found.
230. Complaint at 1–2, Townsend v. Lucy, No. 611A (Va. Cir. Ct. Dinwiddie County 1962).
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that he intended to exercise this option and had arranged for the
payment of the $12,000, Lucy—not one to shy away from a fight or an
231
opportunity—refused to deliver title to the property. Townsend and
his wife filed a complaint to compel performance, again in Judge
Jefferson’s court, and later settled with Lucy for a revised price of
232
$15,000.
Based on this evidence, we can begin to piece together the
profits the Lucy brothers made from their purchase and truncated
sale of the Ferguson farm. Assuming that the Lucy brothers sold the
farm’s timber for $85,000—the price that the Lumber Distribution
Company borrowed from the Petersburg Savings and American Trust
233
Bank —and that the 367.7 acres of land sold to Continental were
sold at the same per-acre price as the price originally agreed to by
234
Welford and Townsend—$12,000 for 103.9 acres —we estimate that
by 1962 the Lucy brothers had earned at least $142,000 from their
235
$50,000 investment less than a decade earlier.
This is not a scientific calculation. It assumes for convenience
that the previously wooded 367.7 acres were sold at the same price as
the 103.9 acres that were used for farming and that contained the
dwellings and farm equipment. Our calculation also does not include
the income from leasing the farm to Townsend before the sale in
1962. Nonetheless, it is our best approximation based on the available
evidence. If anything, reports from the Lucy descendants suggest that
our estimate might be too conservative. John C. Lucy III, for
example, recalled being told that John and Welford had earned at
236
least four times what they had paid for the farm in 1954. Taken

231. Id. at 3.
232. Deed of Trust (1962), 114 DINWIDDIE COUNTY DEED BOOK 302, 302–04.
233. Because the timber was used as collateral for the loan, the loan likely would not have
exceeded the value of the collateral.
234. At that agreed upon price—$12,000 for 103.9 acres—367.7 acres would be worth
$42,468.
235. $85,000 (our estimated price for the timber) + $42,468 (our estimated price for the
367.7 acres of timberland) + $15,000 (our estimated price paid by Townsend for the farmland) =
$142,468.
236. Interview with John C. Lucy III and John C. Lucy IV, supra note 208. Neighbors and
members of the Zehmer family also report that the Ferguson farm had a grand Southern estate
house on it. The estate house was torn down sometime after the Lucys bought the property.
One neighbor suggests that Lucy sold the house so that it could be taken apart piece by piece
and then shipped to and rebuilt by a businessman up North. Interview with Floyd M. Harrison
Jr., supra note 110. We have not been able to confirm this report, but if true, it also would
increase the estimated profit that Lucy made from the Ferguson farm. The story is consistent
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together, the evidence convincingly suggests that Lucy, and not
Zehmer, reaped windfall profits from the sale enforced by the
Virginia Supreme Court in Lucy v. Zehmer.
CONCLUSION
Prudent parents have reminded their children for generations
that money does not grow on trees. Our investigation into Lucy v.
Zehmer suggests that legal scholars should revisit that conclusion.
Money can grow on trees, and it was doing just that in southern
Virginia when Zehmer and Lucy met just before Christmas in 1952.
The Lucy brothers, understanding that changing circumstances were
making southern timberlands more valuable, were quick to capitalize
on these developments. Most landowners like Zehmer, by contrast,
were slower to understand these trends, even as middlemen like the
Lucy brothers expressed considerable interest in what historically had
237
been remote and commercially undesirable lands. A frequent
consequence when a broker met a landowner was a speedy sale that
the landowner promptly regretted. A long list of litigated cases, some
now famous, memorializes the economic and social turbulence that
this industrialization stirred.
This was the context in which Lucy met Zehmer for a drink
before Christmas in 1952, and understanding this context changes the
interpretation of the case. Justice Buchanan, looking at the outward
manifestations of Zehmer’s reported conduct and believing that
$50,000 was more than a fair price, concluded that Lucy had been
reasonable in thinking that Zehmer had intended to become
contractually bound and thus enforced the written instrument. Our
with Lucy’s liquidation of other assets on the property and may explain some of the extra profits
described by John C. Lucy’s descendants.
237. In a sense, Lucy v. Zehmer was rooted in an asymmetry of information between the
Lucy brothers—industry middlemen who regularly kept apprised of the industry’s growing
capacity and demand—and Zehmer—a local landowner who lacked this critical knowledge.
Lucy was not the only lumberman to take advantage of his superior knowledge about the value
of timberlands. Indeed, a study commissioned by the Virginia legislature found that small
sawmills had exploited their market knowledge and the “ignorance” of family landowners. See
supra note 180 and accompanying text. Problems arising out of asymmetric information are
nothing new to contract law, and courts have grappled with cases arising out of disparities in
knowledge between buyers and sellers at least since the Supreme Court’s seminal opinion in
Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817). In that case, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for
the Court, ruled that a buyer is not obligated to share his superior knowledge with a prospective
seller “where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties.” Id. at 195.
Nonetheless, Chief Justice Marshall warned, “[E]ach party must take care not to say or do any
thing tending to impose upon the other.” Id.
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research suggests that the value of the farm’s timber alone far
exceeded $50,000. We also know that Dinwiddie County was
swarming with aggressive timber brokers like the Lucy brothers,
many of whom employed unseemly tactics, many of whom had their
eyes on the Ferguson farm, and many of whom—the record indicates
as many as twenty-five—had been previously rebuffed by Zehmer. In
light of this context of rapidly rising land values and hastily created
contracts, one can understand Judge Jefferson’s refusal to intervene
and enforce the contract.
We conclude that the outward manifestations observed by
Justice Buchanan and the Virginia Supreme Court revealed only part
of what was well known to the parties—and likely well known to the
trial judge as well. Ironically, the historical analysis of the case that is
most often used to teach the objective method of contracts in fact
demonstrates the deep limitations of that method. Although
“objective” connotes a scientific approach, relying on different
outward manifestations can lead to different conclusions.
238
Cicero demanded that historians, above all, must tell the truth.
The story of Lucy v. Zehmer reveals that the truth frequently offers
sufficient material for talented historians and creative lawyers to
construct alternative narratives. Although our reconstruction of Lucy
v. Zehmer contrasts sharply with the traditional telling, the case
remains a useful tool for studying the objective theory of contracts.
Both Justice Buchanan’s account and our own are supported by facts.
Therein lies the art of the objective method.
POSTSCRIPT
Five decades after Justice Buchanan issued his opinion in Lucy v.
Zehmer, a law professor at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill prepared to discuss the case with his contracts class.
Surveying the class to select a student to summarize the facts of the
case, one name caught his eye. “Mr. Lucy, would you care to share
what you know about this case?” That student was John C. Lucy IV,
239
the great-grandson of the original coplaintiff, John C. Lucy. Once
again, a Lucy was being asked to explain the curious events that
238. See 2 CICERO, DE ORATORE ¶ 62, at 245 (E.W. Sutton trans., 3d prtg. 1967) (“For who
does not know history’s first law to be that an author must not dare to tell anything but the
truth? And its second that he must make bold to tell the whole truth? That there must be no
suggestion of partiality anywhere in his writings? Nor of malice?”).
239. Interview with John C. Lucy III and John C. Lucy IV, supra note 208.
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transpired in a Dinwiddie restaurant just days before Christmas in
1952.
Much has changed in Dinwiddie County since that night in 1952.
The development of Interstate Highways 85 and 95, for example, has
had a devastating effect on local businesses along Highway 1. A drive
through the area reveals a virtual rust belt of old hotels and
restaurants like Zehmer’s place, Ye Olde Virginnie. Even Ye Olde
Virginnie is no longer open to those passing through town; instead, in
an ironic twist, Ye Olde Virginnie has been transformed into a
retirement community. Many of these changes began with the
transformation of Virginia’s economy in the 1950s and 1960s. And
leading the way was Governor Harrison, who is fondly remembered
as a driving force behind the modernization of industry across the
240
state.
The Lucy brothers in particular capitalized on these changes.
Even as he supplied timber to industry titans, John C. Lucy built his
241
own small timber empire called the Brunswick Box Company.
Originally founded to produce tobacco boxes, the company soon
transitioned to manufacturing wood pallets for transporting
242
supplies. The company is still run by Emory Lucy, one of John C.
243
Lucy’s sons. Another son—John C. Lucy Jr.—founded his own
244
pallet business, the Abell Lumber Corporation, a decade later. By
the mid-1990s, John C. Lucy Jr.’s company had merged with other
entities to become Pallet Management Systems, Inc., a multimilliondollar publicly traded company led by John C. Lucy Jr.’s son, John C.
245
Lucy III. Though briefly successful, Pallet Management Systems
experienced financial troubles during a market downturn several
years after its incorporation and filed for bankruptcy protection in
246
2003. Despite this loss, John C. Lucy III continues to work as
president of Clary Lumber, a hardwood-lumber sawmill located in
Gaston, North Carolina, that his father first bought to supply lumber

240. See Saxon, supra note 38 (“Mr. Harrison’s time in office came as the state turned from
a rural to an industrialized society, and he contributed significantly to that development with
road construction and other economic programs.”).
241. Interview with Emory Lucy, supra note 118.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113.
245. Marguerite M. Plunkett, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 28, 1996, at 1E.
246. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113.
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247

to the Abell Lumber Corporation. More than fifty years later, the
248
Lucy family is still picking money off of trees.
Welford Lucy took a slightly different path after Lucy v. Zehmer.
In 1954, Welford left Dinwiddie for Warrenton, Virginia, where he
purchased a farm to raise cattle and opened a Stuckies store along
249
Highway 17. Just over a decade later, after making a significant
profit selling his Warrenton farm, Welford moved to Richmond to
250
apply his talents to investing in real estate. Though Welford was
initially successful at flipping other properties, his new business
251
slowed down after a bad investment in an office building. The
investment loss was not enough to ruin Welford financially, but it was
a painful shock to the ego of a man remembered for his intense pride
252
in his business talents. He later was sued by the buyer of another
property for failing to disclose the existence of contaminated storage
253
tanks that required an expensive cleanup. Welford lost that dispute,
254
but when all was said and done, he still died a wealthy man. Family
members report that John’s and Welford’s siblings all exhibited a
canny business sense and enjoyed similar financial success, and that
each of the five children who grew up on a struggling farm left
255
lucrative estates for their descendants.
The timber industry has changed as well. Regional prices for
timber eventually stabilized, and large entities emerged to manage
247. Id.; Interview with Meade Lucy, supra note 119. Welford reportedly had observed how
profitable a Stuckey’s franchise had been for his daughter and son-in-law and had concluded
that he too should pursue the opportunity. Interview with Meade Lucy, supra note 119.
248. Perhaps because of this continued success, members of the Lucy family speak with
pride about the business activities of John and Welford—even when discussing the specific case
of Lucy v. Zehmer. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra
note 113. They realize, for example, how difficult the task of cruising timberlands and predicting
timber prices could be, and they are proud that John and Welford were able, despite their
limited educations, to build a burgeoning business from their natural talent and skills. Id. The
Zehmers, by contrast, are much more reticent to discuss the case on the record, with one family
member acknowledging that the case continues to carry a stigma for the family. Telephone
Interview with a Zehmer Family Member, supra note 109.
249. Interview with Meade Lucy, supra note 119.
250. See id. Descendants recall that the development of Interstate 66 near Welford’s farm
had dramatically raised the value of the property. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy
III, and James Lucy, supra note 113.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Emergency Special Servs., Inc. v. Matrix Constr. Corp., 13 Va. Cir. 287, 287 (Va. Cir.
Ct. 1988).
254. Interview with Meade Lucy, supra note 119.
255. Interview with John C. Lucy Jr., John C. Lucy III, and James Lucy, supra note 113.
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and harvest timberlands more efficiently than their family-owned
predecessors. A majority of the Ferguson farm remains controlled by
these interests to this day, with neat rows of pine trees packed
together across the expansive property and signs of a small harvest
apparent on its periphery.
Perhaps one other thing that will change will be the way law
students understand Lucy v. Zehmer. Unlike the caricature portrayed
in the contracts classroom, the case involved sophisticated
businessmen, a tumultuous economic climate, and the persistent
lesson that appellate courts—and generations of contracts scholars—
should be hesitant before confidently claiming to understand the facts
of the case before them.

